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Citizens United and Forced Speech: 
Why Protecting the Dissenting Shareholder 
Necessitates Disclosure of Corporate Political 
Expenditures After Citizens United v. FEC
Sabina Bunt Thaler*
"Corporation, n. 
An ingenious device for obtaining individual profit without individual 
responsibility. 
 —Ambrose Bierce, The Devil’s Dictionary"1
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Stephen Colbert:  Now what does it mean to individual donations?   Like a 
corporation as a person . . . gets to give any amount of money, but I as a 
person can only give twenty-five hundred dollars? 
Jeffrey Toobin:  Right, that is what is potentially the next legal 
challenge.  Because if giving money is a form of speech, as the Court 
has held at various times, you can’t prohibit a company from giving 
money and then presumably the next step would be you can’t have limits 
on how much individuals could give either.  That’s the potential 
implication of this decision. 
Colbert:  . . . Right now corporations will actually have more power as 
people than people, until people catch up with corporations? 
Toobin:  That is exactly right, that would be the rule. 
Colbert:  So that actually kind of confuses me, how corporations are 
more people than people.  Could we um, could we settle that by ruling 
that people aren’t people. 
Toobin:  I do not think that that is going to be the way the Court rules—
ruling that people aren’t people. 
Colbert:  Have you met Justice Scalia?2
Introduction 
Protesters rallied outside of Target Corporation’s (Target) Minnesota 
corporate headquarters for weeks following the revelation that Target had 
given money to help Republican gubernatorial candidate, Tom Emmer, an 
outspoken opponent of gay marriage.3  As one of the first major 
corporations to take advantage of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in 
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission,4 that held unconstitutional 
                                                                                                                 
 2. The Colbert Report:  Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission:  Jeffrey 
Toobin (Comedy Central television broadcast Sept. 15, 2009), http://www.colbertnation.com 
/the-colbert-report-videos/249057/september-15-2009/citizens-united-v--federal-election-
commission---jeffrey-toobin. 
 3. Martiga Lohn, Liberal Groups Push to Exploit Target Backlash, ASSOCIATED 
PRESS (Aug. 13, 2010, 9:32 AM EDT), available at http://finance.yahoo.com/news/Liberal-
groups-push-to-apf-2321043209.html?x=0 (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of 
Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 4. See Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 130 S. Ct. 876, 913 (2010) 
(overruling Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990), which held a 
Michigan statute restricting corporate spending in connection to state elections did not 
violate First Amendment, and parts of McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003), which upheld 
constitutionality of various restrictions on soft money contributions to state committees). 
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restrictions on corporate political expenditures, Target became a bull’s-eye 
for gay rights groups and liberal political advocacy groups, alike.5  As a 
result of Target’s political expenditures, pop music sensation Lady Gaga 
dumped her endorsement deal with the company,6 and the future of a 
planned San Francisco expansion, once met with enthusiasm, now hangs in 
the balance.7  The uproar that followed Target’s political spending 
motivated Target’s CEO, Gregg Steinhafel, to issue a public apology and a 
promise that Target would more closely oversee its political spending.8
Yet, just two months after Mr. Steinhafel’s apology, documents filed with 
the Federal Election Commission (FEC) reveal that Target continued to 
fund anti-gay rights politicians.9  Although the legacy of Target’s political 
spending is not yet certain, the public outcry over its political advocacy 
illustrates the passionate disapproval corporate political spending can 
invoke in those who disagree with the speech. 
With nearly one hundred million Americans investing in mutual funds, 
unfettered corporate political spending risks offending the speech rights of 
millions of Americans.10  People define themselves in many ways, but 
fundamental to individuality is the choice of what to say and which cause to 
support.11  Policies such as affirmative action, welfare, and a woman’s right 
to choose turn on their public and congressional support—support that 
inevitably manifests itself in political expenditures.12  These political 
                                                                                                                 
 5. Lohn, supra note 3. 
 6. Mary Papenfuss, Gaga Dumps Target Deal in Gay Rights Flap, NEWSER (Mar. 9, 
2011, 2:00 AM CST), available at http://www.newser.com/story/113697/gaga-dumps-
target-deal-in-gay-rghts-flap.html (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil 
Rights and Social Justice). 
 7. Lohn, supra note 3. 
 8. Press Release, Target Brands, Inc., Civic Activity (Aug. 5, 2010), available at
http://pressroom.target.com/pr/news/civic-activity.aspx (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 9. Abe Sauer, The Anti-Gay Donations that Target Apologized for?  They Never 
Stopped, THE AWL, Dec. 21, 2010, available at http://www.theawl.com/2010/12/the-anti-
gay-donations-that-target-apologized-for-they-never-stopped (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 10. See discussion infra Part IV.B.1.c (discussing prevalence of Americans who own 
stock in mutual funds). 
 11. See Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 130 S. Ct. 876, 913 (2010) 
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting "selection of public officials, 
[is] an area in which ‘the interests of unwilling . . . corporate shareholders [in not being] 
forced to subsidize that speech are at their zenith" (alteration added) (internal citation 
omitted)). 
 12. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19 (invalidating some campaign finance 
reforms on the theory that money is itself a form of speech protected by the First 
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expenditures should reflect the support they are intended to convey.  Or, at 
the very least, those funding the electioneering communication should be 
able to withdraw their financial support from political expenditures with 
which they disagree. 
When corporations use general treasury money to finance 
electioneering communications, they use their shareholders’ money to fund 
their corporate speech.13  Corporate laws such as the business judgment rule 
allow corporations to make these business decisions without shareholder 
consent.14  Yet, political expenditures are fundamentally different from 
general business decisions because political expenditures support causes 
intrinsic to self-expression.15  An interesting body of law, termed the 
"Forced Speech Doctrine," holds that freedom of speech under the First 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution16 includes freedom from compulsory 
speech.17  The two major Supreme Court cases in this boutique category of 
First Amendment jurisprudence are Keller v. State Bar of California,18 and 
Abood v. Detroit Board of Education.19  These cases held that dissenting 
attorneys and nonunion public school teachers, respectively, could not be 
required by law to contribute money to an organization that uses 
compulsory dues to make political expenditures that are unrelated to the 
organization’s mission.20  Such compulsory dues constitute a violation of 
the individuals’ freedom of speech under the First Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution.21  As this Note will discuss, after Citizens United,
                                                                                                                 
Amendment). 
 13. See discussion infra Part III.C (discussing shareholders and forced speech).
 14. See discussion infra Part IV.B.2 (explaining business judgment rule). 
 15. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 16–17 (noting that spending money can operate as a form 
of personal expression). 
 16. See U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom 
of speech."). 
 17. See discussion infra Part III (discussing the forced speech doctrine). 
 18. See Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1, 13–15 (1990) (holding State Bar’s use 
of compulsory dues to finance political and ideological activities with which members 
disagreed violated members’ First Amendment right of free speech when such expenditures 
were not necessarily or reasonably incurred for the purpose of regulating the legal profession 
or improving the quality of legal services). 
 19. See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Ed., 431 U.S. 209, 235–36 (1977) (holding 
Constitution requires that objecting nonunion employees not be required to pay dues to the 
union when the union uses those dues to further political and ideological speech with which 
they disagree provided such uses are not germane to the services the union provides). 
 20. See supra text accompanying notes 18–19 (describing Court’s holdings in Abood 
and Keller). 
 21. Keller, 496 U.S. at 13–15; Abood, 431 U.S. at 235–36. 
596 17 WASH. & LEE J.C.R. & SOC. JUST. 591 (2011)
corporations may use their general treasuries to fund political causes that 
may, or may not be germane to the corporation’s mission.22  Because 
shareholders own corporations,23 this Note first explores whether 
corporations force dissenting shareholders to speak when they avail 
themselves of the spending rights recognized in Citizens United.
Safeguarding freedom of expression requires protecting dissenting 
shareholders from being forced to support disagreeable causes.  To provide 
such protection, it is paramount that corporations disclose how they are 
spending their shareholders’ money.24  This Note discusses various options 
for improving disclosure of corporate political expenditures.25
This Note concludes that without disclosure and disclaimer safeguards, 
the Citizens United decision allows corporations to compel shareholders to 
speak when corporations spend money from the corporate treasury on 
disagreeable electioneering communications.26  First, in Part I, this Note 
discusses the impact of the Supreme Court’s recent campaign finance 
decision holding unconstitutional prohibitions on corporate political 
expenditures.27  Next, Part II briefly explores the history of campaign 
finance regulation and the Court’s consideration of the legislation’s 
constitutionality.28  Then, discussing the forced speech doctrine, Part III 
analyzes the implications of the forced speech doctrine after Citizens 
United.29  Transitioning to a proposed solution, Part IV rejects the efficacy 
of various aspects of current disclosure and disclaimer regulations in 
advising shareholders of corporate expenditures.30  Finally, Part V 
recommends various improvements to the current disclosure and disclaimer 
                                                                                                                 
 22. See discussion infra Parts I, III (discussing corporate political spending after 
Citizens United).
 23. See ROBERT W. HAMILTON & RICHARD A. BOOTH, BUSINESS BASICS FOR LAW 
STUDENTS 284 (Aspen Publishers, 4th ed. 2006) (defining publicly held businesses as "those 
in which a public market exists for ownership interests"). 
 24. Infra Parts IV–V. 
 25. Infra Parts IV.B.1, V. 
 26. This Note uses the term "disagreeable electioneering communications" to indicate 
corporate electioneering communications supporting or opposing political causes with which 
the corporation’s shareholder(s) disagree. 
 27. See discussion infra Part I (describing Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 913 
(2010)). 
 28. See discussion infra Part II (explaining history of campaign finance reform). 
 29. See discussion infra Part III (discussing the forced speech doctrine). 
 30. See discussion infra Part IV (analyzing corporate democracy and current 
disclosure and disclaimer legislation). 
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legislation that strike a balance between the First Amendment rights of 
corporations and shareholders alike.31
I.  Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission 
Motivated by concerns of corruption, unfair influence, and compelled 
shareholder expression, Congress had successfully restricted corporate 
electioneering for the past sixty-three years.32  But, in January 2010, the 
Court, by a 5-to-4 vote, dismantled these campaign-financing safeguards, 
and in so doing, uprooted more than half a century of restrictions and two 
decades of law.33  In Citizens United v. FEC, the Supreme Court held 
unconstitutional federal restrictions on independent political expenditures.34
A.  Background Story of the Case 
In the wake of the 2008 presidential election, a conservative 
organization called Citizens United produced Hillary:  The Movie (Hillary 
Movie),35 which functioned as a right-wing perspective on the life of, then-
presidential hopeful—Secretary Hillary Rodham Clinton.36  Although 
Hillary Movie almost certainly appealed to its key demographic, it never 
                                                                                                                 
 31. See discussion infra Part V (recommending improvements to current disclosure 
and disclaimer legislation). 
 32. See CIARA TORRES-SPELLISCY, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE, CORPORATE 
CAMPAIGN SPENDING: GIVING SHAREHOLDERS A VOICE 7–8 (2010), http://www.brennan 
center.org/page//publications/shareholdersvoice2_5_10.pdf (explaining corporate political 
spending banned for past sixty-three years). 
 33. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 913 (2010) (overruling Austin v. Mich. 
State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990), which held a Michigan statute restricting 
corporate spending in connection to state elections did not violate the First Amendment, and 
parts of McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003), which upheld the constitutionality of 
various restrictions on soft money contributions to state committees); see also TORRES-
SPELLISCY, supra note 32, at 7–8 (discussing the effect of Citizens United). 
 34. See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 913 (holding that a ban imposed on independent 
corporate political expenditures violated the First Amendment because the Government 
could not suppress political speech on the basis of the speaker’s identity as business 
corporation). 
 35. HILLARY: THE MOVIE (Citizens United 2008), available at http://video.google 
.com/videoplay?docid=8464923602139974671# (last visited Oct. 7, 2010). 
 36. See Philip Rucker, Citizens United Used ‘Hillary:  The Movie’ to Take on 
McCain-Feingold, WASH. POST, Jan. 22, 2010, available at http://www.washington 
post.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/01/21/AR2010012103582.html?sid=ST2010012104871 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice) 
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had the chance to become a blockbuster.37  For, as many in Hollywood 
would probably attest:  one bad review can bring even the surest hit to its 
knees.  And for Hillary Movie, that critique came from a Washington panel 
of judges who concluded that this "scalding documentary . . . was not really 
a movie at all."38  Determining that Hillary Movie was not so much of a 
documentary as it was a "90-minute campaign ad," the panel concluded the 
movie was "susceptible of no other interpretation than to inform the 
electorate that Senator Clinton is unfit for office, that the United States 
would be a dangerous place in a President Hillary Clinton world, and that 
viewers should vote against her."39  This review was not just bad for 
viewership; it crippled the entire project.  As a documentary, Hillary Movie
would have been accorded the full breadth of First Amendment rights, but 
Hillary Movie’s designation as a campaign advertisement (or, 
"electioneering") catapulted it into conflict with restrictions on distribution 
and advertising under the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 
(BCRA).40  This Act limited how and when the movie could be 
disseminated and advertised.41
                                                                                                                 
 37. See id. (observing Hillary Movie never became a blockbuster). 
 38. Robert Barnes, ‘Hillary:  The Movie’ to Get Supreme Court Screening, WASH.
POST, Mar. 15, 2009, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/ 
article/2009/03/14/AR2009031401603_pf.html (describing Hillary Movie) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 39. See Citizens United v. FEC, 530 F. Supp. 2d 274, 279–80 (D.D.C. 2008) (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (finding Hillary Movie was the functional equivalent of express 
advocacy); see also Barnes, supra note 38 (describing Citizens United group’s purpose in 
creating Hillary Movie).
 40. See Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 
81 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C.) (amending Federal Election Campaign 
Act of 1971 (FECA), Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972)).  BCRA amended FECA to prohibit soft 
money contributions to federal campaigns.  BCRA § 101 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 441).  
Prior to BCRA, corporations, unions, and individuals were allowed to exceed the maximum 
permissible contribution by donating to "political parties for activities intended to influence state or 
local elections."  McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 123 (2003).  Furthermore, the 
FECA’s disclosure and financing limitations applied only to express advocacy.  Id. at 126.  Thus, 
"[t]he political parties . . . could not use soft money to sponsor ads that used any magic words, and 
corporations and unions could not fund such ads out of their general treasures."  Id.  However, 
corporations could freely sponsor ads that did not "‘expressly advocate the election or defeat of a 
clearly identified candidate’"—termed so-called issue ads.  Id. (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 
1, 80 (1976) (per curiam)). As such, not only could corporations fund issue ads with soft money, 
those ads "could be aired without disclosing the identity of, or any information about, their sponsors" 
because the FECA’s disclosure provisions were also inapplicable to issue advocacy.  Id.  The 
combined effect of the soft money loophole and the distinction between issue and express advocacy 
resulted in unfettered corporate sponsorship for political advertisements.  Id. at 127–28 
("Corporations and unions spent hundreds of millions of dollars of their general funds to pay for 
these ads, and those expenditures, like soft-money donations to the political parties, were unregulated 
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The BCRA applied to Citizens United despite the group’s 
classification as a nonprofit because Citizens United partially financed the 
movie with corporate funds.  Under BCRA: 
Citizens United could show [Hillary Movie] in theaters and sell it on 
DVDs, but promoting it through its planned advertising campaign was 
restricted.  And the prohibitions on broadcast just before an election 
doomed the group’s hope of paying $1.2 million to have the movie 
available on cable systems around the country via video-on-demand 
services.42
The freedom to show and sell Hillary Movie did not appease Citizens 
United, as the group viewed the Federal Election Commission’s (FEC) 
restrictions on distributing the movie as a threat to Citizen United’s 
freedom of speech.43  Seizing the opportunity to take-on the BCRA, the 
organization’s leader, David Bossie, sued—and thus was born Citizens 
United v. FEC.44
After a fairly predictable loss in the lower court,45 Citizens United 
appealed the decision directly to the Supreme Court.46  The Court agreed to 
hear the case, and in March 2009, Deputy Solicitor General Malcolm L. 
Stewart, for the Government, and Theodore Olson, along with Michael 
Boos and veteran First Amendment lawyer Floyd Abrams, for Citizens 
United, argued the case before the Court for the first time.47  But, after 
                                                                                                                 
under FECA.").  Reacting to a Senate committee report concluding that corporations were evading 
the FECA’s candidate contribution limits through issue advertising and soft money contributions, 
Congress enacted BCRA.  Id. at 131–32.  Congress designed BCRA to address these concerns: 
Title I regulates the use of soft money by political parties, office-holders, and 
candidates.  Title II primarily prohibits corporations and labor unions from using 
general treasury funds for communications that are intended to, or have the effect of, 
influencing the outcome of federal elections. 
Id. at 132. 
 41. See Barnes, supra note 38 (noting BCRA’s broadcasting and advertising 
restrictions). 
 42. Id.
 43. Rucker, supra note 36. 
 44. Id.
 45. See Citizens United v. FEC, 530 F. Supp. 2d 274, 282 (D.D.C. 2008) (denying 
Citizens United’s request for an injunction against the FEC’s decision to enforce § 203 of 
the BCRA). 
 46. See Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-115, § 403(a)(3), 
116 Stat. 81, 113–14 (granting Supreme Court authority to hear direct appeals in disputes 
arising under the BCRA). 
 47. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 886, Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 
913 (2010) (No. 08-205); see also Rucker, supra note 36 (noting timing of case and 
600 17 WASH. & LEE J.C.R. & SOC. JUST. 591 (2011)
Stewart responded affirmatively to a hypothetical posed by the Chief 
Justice that the Government could ban a "500-page book [if] at the end it 
says, ‘And so vote for X.,’"48 the Court asked for reargument on whether it 
should overrule two prominent cases upholding the regulations at issue in 
Citizens United—McConnell v. FEC,49 and Austin v. Michigan Chamber of 
Commerce.50
Overrule these key First Amendment precedents the Court did.51  In 
January 2010, Justice Kennedy announced the Court’s decision overruling 
Austin and the part of McConnell that upheld BCRA § 203’s52 extension of 
§ 441b’s53 restrictions on corporate independent expenditures.54
Announcing the Court was returning to the principle that "the Government 
may not suppress political speech on the basis of the speaker’s corporate 
                                                                                                                 
attorneys arguing each side before the Court). 
 48. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 47. 
 49. See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 206 (2003) (upholding § 203’s regulation of 
independent corporate expenditures).  Immediately after the BCRA was enacted, multiple 
plaintiffs challenged § 203 as an unconstitutional speech restriction because the prohibited 
"electioneering communications" extended beyond express advocacy.  See id. at 205–06.  
Reasoning that the same justifications for regulating independent corporate expenditures 
constituting express advocacy apply to ads that are "the functional equivalent of express 
advocacy," the Court upheld § 203 as facially constitutional.  See id. at 206.  The McConnell
Court found such regulation acceptable because these types of independent corporate 
expenditures could have the kind of "corrosive and distorting effect" on the electorate that 
Austin recognized as constituting a compelling governmental interest in countering those 
effects.  See id. at 205.  Of particular importance, although the Supreme Court held § 203 
facially constitutional, it noted that future as-applied challenges may nonetheless succeed.  
See id.
 50. See Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 669 (1990) 
(holding as constitutional a narrowly tailored Michigan law restricting corporate campaign 
contributions to state elections); see also Paul M. Smith et al., Supreme Court Seems Poised 
to Invalidate a Key Campaign Finance Law, 26 COMM. LAW. 27, 27 (2009), available at
http://www.jenner.com/files/tbl_s20Publications%5CRelatedDocumentsPDFs1252%5C2574
%5CCL%2026-3%20JULY%202009_SMITH-FALLOW-CARPENTER-BLOCK.PDF 
(discussing procedural history in Citizens United).
 51. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 913 (2010) (overruling Austin and 
parts of McConnell).
 52. 2 U.S.C.A. § 203 (West 2010) (amending Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, 
Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (codified at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431–442 (2010)).  Section 203 of the 
BCRA prohibited corporations from using general treasury funds to fund electioneering 
communications.  2 U.S.C.A. § 441b(b)(2) (West 2010), invalidated by Citizens United v. 
Federal Election Commission, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
 53. 2 U.S.C.A. § 441b (West 2010), invalidated by Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 
876 (2010). 
 54. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 913 (2010) (overruling Austin and 
parts of McConnell). 
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identity," the Citizens United Court found that no sufficient governmental 
interest justifies limits on political expenditures of nonprofit or for-profit 
corporations.55
In what may be one of the most significant of the Roberts Court’s 
decisions, the Justices had created a blockbuster out of a controversy over a 
minor movie produced by a nonprofit corporation with an annual budget of 
a mere twelve million dollars.56  But, not all of the Justices were pleased 
with the Court’s about-face.  "Essentially," wrote Justice Stevens in his 
dissent, "five Justices were unhappy with the limited nature of the case 
before us, so they changed the case to give themselves an opportunity to 
change the law."57  Finding deep flaws in the approach the Court took to 
reach its decision,58 Justice Stevens criticized the Court’s opinion as: 
[A] rejection of the common sense of the American people, who have 
recognized a need to prevent corporations from undermining self-
government since the founding, and who have fought against the 
distinctive corrupting potential of corporate electioneering since the 
days of Theodore Roosevelt.59
B.  Shareholders’ Rights in Citizens United 
The Citizens United Court treated the shareholder-protection interest 
almost as an afterthought.60  Rejecting the Government’s contention that 
corporate independent expenditures may be regulated "because of [the 
government’s] interest in protecting dissenting shareholders from being 
compelled to fund corporate political speech," the majority reasoned that if 
this interest was sufficient, the Government might try to "restrict the media 
corporations’ political speech."61  Moreover, the Court found the statute 
                                                                                                                 
 55. Id.  But see discussion infra Part IV (upholding disclosure and disclaimer 
requirements under the BCRA). 
 56. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 886–87. 
 57. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 58. See id. at 941–42 ("In the end, the Court’s rejection of Austin and McConnell 
comes down to nothing more than its disagreement with their results.").  Justice Stevens 
continued:  "[T]he majority opinion is essentially an amalgamation of resuscitated dissents.  
The only relevant thing that has changed since Austin and McConnell is the composition of 
this Court."  Id.
 59. Id. at 979. 
 60. See discussion infra Part I.B (discussing minimal coverage of shareholder-
protection interest by Citizens United majority).  
 61. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 911 (2010) (majority opinion). 
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"both underinclusive and overinclusive."62  On the one hand, the statute was 
underinclusive because it only protected dissenting shareholders from 
corporate speech within one to two months before an election.63
Furthermore, the statute only prohibited corporate spending on certain types 
of media, consequently leaving corporations free to sponsor electioneering 
via the Internet.64  On the other hand, the majority criticized the statute 
as overinclusive because it applied to all corporations, even those with 
only a single shareholder.65  Justice Stevens’s dissent included a more 
satisfactory analysis of the interest in protecting shareholders, noting 
that:
When corporations use general treasury funds to praise or attack a 
particular candidate for office, it is the shareholders, as the residual 
claimants, who are effectively footing the bill.  Those shareholders 
who disagree with the corporation’s electoral message may find 
their financial investments being used to undermine their political 
convictions.66
Characterizing as "utopian" the majority’s view that procedures of 
corporate democracy will correct this interest, Justice Stevens noted 
the inadequacy of these procedures and reaffirmed Austin’s use of the 
shareholder protection interest to reinforce the antidistortion 
rationale.67
Ensuring a proper understanding of the risk to shareholders’ 
freedom of speech after Citizens United requires a brief history of 
Congress’s attempts to regulate money in politics.  This history reveals 
that corporate money has played a prominent role in American 
elections since the founding of this country.68  Furthermore, concern 
                                                                                                                 
 62. Id.
 63. See id. ("[I]f Congress had been seeking to protect dissenting shareholders, it 
would not have banned corporate speech in only certain media within 30 or 60 days before 
an election."). 
 64. See id. at 913 ("Soon, however, it may be that Internet sources, such as blogs and 
social networking Web sites, will provide citizens with significant information about 
political candidates and issues."). 
 65. Id. at 911 ("[T]he statute is overinclusive because it covers all corporations, 
including nonprofit corporations and for-profit corporations with only single shareholders."). 
 66. Id. at 977. 
 67. Id. at 979 ("Recognizing the limits of the shareholder protection rationale, the 
Austin Court did not hold it out as an adequate and independent ground for sustaining the 
statute in question. Rather, the Court applied it to reinforce the antidistortion 
rationale . . . ."). 
 68. Infra at Part II. 
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for protecting shareholders from compelled speech motivated 
campaign finance regulations from as early as 1907.69  Understanding 
the successes and failures of former legislation helps inform future 
campaign finance regulations that are both protective of shareholder 
speech and constitutional. 
II.  Money in Politics:  The History of Campaign Financing 
Money and politics have intertwined since the founding of this 
country.  Indeed, even back in 1757, with only 391 eligible voters, George 
Washington "spent £39 to buy ‘treats’ for voters, including 160 gallons of 
rum and other strong beverages, or more than a quart per eligible voter."70
In the early days of America’s elections, money spent on political 
campaigns went largely unregulated, often coming out of the candidate’s 
own pocket.71  But, with the evolution of the party system throughout the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, fundraising for candidates grew 
increasingly more common.72
Much of the funding for the post-Civil War era campaigns came from 
the practice of assessments on officeholders.73  This officeholder 
assessment practice consisted of awarding government jobs—and allowing 
officeholders to retain their government jobs—on the basis of whether the 
individual contributed a portion of her salary to the political party.74  This 
assessment system was so popular that "by 1878 approximately 90 percent 
of the Republican Party congressional committees’ income came from 
assessments on officeholders."75  The Pendleton Act76 brought the end of 
assessments as a source of campaign finance.77  As a result, parties 
                                                                                                                 
 69. See discussion infra Part II (describing shareholder protection interest motivating 
Tillman Act). 
 70. BRADLEY A. SMITH, UNFREE SPEECH: THE FOLLY OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM
18 (Princeton Univ. Press 2001). 
 71. See id. (discussing early American campaign finance). 
 72. See id. at 20 (noting steady growth of money in elections). 
 73. Id.
 74. See id. (discussing that officeholders were usually expected to contribute two-
percent of their salary to the party funds). 
 75. Id. 
 76. See Pendleton Civil Service Reform (Pendleton) Act, ch. 27, 22 Stat. 403 (1883). 
 77. SMITH, supra note 70, at 20. ("The passage of the Pendleton Act, and similar laws 
at the state level, led to a steady decline in assessments as a source of revenue."). 
604 17 WASH. & LEE J.C.R. & SOC. JUST. 591 (2011)
increasingly turned to wealthy individuals to replace this lost income.78
The presidential campaign of 1888 "marked the full-scale development of a 
second new source of campaign cash:  corporations."79  Republicans 
aggressively solicited corporate contributions.80  Their efforts resulted in 
business contributions comprising nearly half of the Republican national 
campaign funds.81  This influx of corporate cash at the beginning of the 
twentieth century dramatically increased the cost of elections82 and soon 
spurned the first campaign fundraising regulations.83
A.  History of Campaign Finance Reform 
The States’ fear of corporate wealth in the political process dates back 
to at least 1897 when four states passed laws banning corporate 
contributions,84 but the federal government did not become involved in 
banning corporate contributions until a 1905 New York investigation into 
the finances of the Equitable Life Insurance Company revealed the 
company had made large contributions to the Republican Party.85  Public 
outcry over this revelation led one "judicial critic of corporate political 
                                                                                                                 
 78. Id. at 20–21. 
 79. Id. at 21. 
 80. See id. (discussing Republican letter-writing campaign soliciting corporate cash). 
 81. See id. (explaining result of corporate solicitation). 
 82. See id. at 21–22 (discussing candidate spending amounting to millions of dollars in 
year 2000 dollars). 
 83. See id at 23 (discussing beginning of campaign fundraising regulations); see also
ANTHONY CORRADO ET AL., THE NEW CAMPAIGN FINANCE SOURCEBOOK 10 (Brookings Inst. 
Press 2005) ("Such lavish contributions from corporate sources alarmed progressive 
reformers and spurred a demand for campaign finance legislation at the national level."). 
 84. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 900 (2010) (majority opinion) (citing 
SMITH, supra note 70, at 23, for the proposition that "[a]t least since the latter part of the 
19th century the laws of some States and of the United States imposed a ban on corporate 
direct contributions to candidates"); see also CORRADO ET AL., supra note 83, at 10 ("By the 
late 1890s, four states had passed laws to prohibit corporate contributions."). 
 85. See SMITH, supra note 70, at 23–24 ("[C]orporate support for the GOP was well 
known before, the Equitable investigation took on the air of scandal.").  In his 1905 annual 
message to Congress, President Roosevelt declared: 
All contributions by corporations to any political committee or for any political 
purpose should be forbidden by law; directors should not be permitted to use 
stockholders’ money for such purposes; and, moreover, a prohibition of this 
kind would be, as far as it went, an effective method of stopping the evils aimed 
at in corrupt practices acts. 
Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 953 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
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contributions [to] call[ ] such involvement a ‘menace to the state.’"86
Ultimately, Congress reacted to the public outcry by passing the Tillman 
Act.87
The Tillman Act banned political contributions by federally chartered 
banks and corporations.88  "The bill’s chief sponsor, segregationist Senator 
‘Pitchfork’ Ben Tillman, argued, much as reform advocates argue today, 
that the American people had come to believe that congressional 
representatives had become the instrumentalities and agents of 
corporations."89  Notably, one of the main concerns leading to the passage 
of the Tillman Act involved preventing corporations from using 
shareholders’ money to support political candidates whom the shareholders 
opposed.90
"Although the Tillman Act may have reduced corporate participation 
in politics, it hardly served to eliminate it."91  Among the reasons 
hampering the Tillman Act’s effectiveness were the many loopholes 
through which corporations avoided regulation.92  Despite—or, perhaps, 
because of—the ineffectiveness of the Tillman Act, Congress again 
attempted to regulate campaign finance in 1910 when it passed the 
Publicity Act.93  The Publicity Act and the subsequent 1911 amendments 
required postelection disclosure in House and Senate races of contributors 
                                                                                                                 
 86. SMITH, supra note 70, at 24. 
 87. See Tillman Act of 1907, ch. 420, 34 Stat. 864 ("It shall be unlawful for any 
national bank, or any corporation organized by authority of any laws of Congress, to make a 
money contribution in connection with any election to any political office.").  "Congress has 
placed special limitations on campaign spending by corporations ever since the passage of 
the Tillman Act in 1907."  See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 930 (2010)  (Stevens, 
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 88. Tillman Act of 1907, ch. 420, 34 Stat. 864. 
 89. SMITH, supra note 70, at 24.  The Tillman Act "was primarily driven by two 
pressing concerns:  first, the enormous power corporations had come to wield in federal 
elections, with the accompanying threat of both actual corruption and a public perception of 
corruption; and second, a respect for the interest of shareholders and members in preventing 
the use of their money to support candidates they opposed."  Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. 
Ct. 876, 953 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 90. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 953 (2010) (discussing concern for 
shareholders as a pressing concern motivating passage of the Tillman Act).
 91. SMITH, supra note 70, at 24. 
 92. See id. at 24 (discussing how corporations were able to continue to participate in 
politics, despite the Tillman Act). 
 93. See Federal Corrupt Practices (Publicity) Act (FCPA) of 1925, 2 U.S.C. § 241, 
amended by Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-220, § 2, 85 Stat. 795, 
795. 
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spending the equivalent of $1,667 in year 2000 dollars.94  "Senator James 
Reed, who first proposed these spending limits, contended that they were 
necessary because only rich people could run for office, unless they were 
‘willing to accept contributions from those institutions which may be 
interested in the legislation.’"95  In the aftermath of Citizens United, this 
Note argues that robust disclosure provides a meaningful option for 
shareholder protection.96  However, the lesson of the Publicity Act and the 
attempts at legislating disclosure that followed is that the loopholes swallow 
the law.  For the Publicity Act, the many legislative loopholes meant that 
the Publicity Act ultimately did little to curb the massive wealth that 
continued to engulf the campaigns.97
Congress’s next foray into campaign finance regulations came in the 
wake of the Teapot Dome scandal.98  Public outcry following the scandal 
led to Congress passing the Federal Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA),99 which 
closed the nonelection-year loophole in the Publicity Act.100  As with past 
congressional attempts at regulation, the FCPA was so riddled with 
loopholes that it was largely ineffective.101  Indeed, during the forty-six 
years the Act was in force, the government did not prosecute a single 
violation under the FCPA.102
By the late 1930s, Republicans and conservative Democrats were 
growing concerned that Roosevelt was building a political power base 
through his New Deal programs.103  Thus, in 1939, a coalition of 
conservative leaders passed the Hatch Act,104 extending the ban on political 
                                                                                                                 
 94. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 61 (1976) (per curiam) (discussing history of 
disclosure requirements). 
 95. SMITH, supra note 70, at 25. 
 96. See discussion infra Parts IV–V (concluding disclosure protects shareholders from 
forced speech). 
 97. See SMITH, supra note 70, at 25 (discussing why Publicity Act was ineffective in 
regulating campaign contributions).   
 98. See CORRADO ET AL., supra note 83, at 14–15 (noting scandal led Congress to pass 
the FCPA). 
 99. Federal Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) of 1925, 2 U.S.C. § 241, amended by 
Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub L. 92-220, § 2, 85 Stat. 795, 795. 
 100. See SMITH, supra note 70, at 26 (discussing FCPA). 
 101. See CORRADO ET AL., supra note 83, at 15 ("Though the law imposed clear 
reporting requirements, it provided for none of the publicity or enforcement mechanisms 
needed to ensure meaningful disclosure.").   
 102. SMITH, supra note 70, at 27. 
 103. Id.
 104. See Act to Prevent Pernicious Political Activities (Hatch Act) of 1939, ch. 410, 53 
Stat. 1147. 
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expenditures in an attempt to apply the protections of the 1883 Pendleton 
Act105 to the New Deal employees.106   Again, however, corporations could 
circumvent these spending limits by funneling money through state and 
local committees.107  Similar fears provoked the 1943 passage of the Smith-
Connally Act,108 which prohibited labor unions from contributing to 
campaigns during the ongoing world war.109  As with past regulations, 
unions found ways to evade Smith-Connally’s restrictions.110  By 
establishing the first political action committees (collectively, PACs), 
unions could circumvent Smith-Connally’s restrictions because PAC 
contributions are made with union members’ money, rather than money 
from the union’s general treasury.111  Furthermore, through a strict 
interpretation of Smith-Connally, unions determined that the Act only 
applied to contributions to particular candidates, and not to contributions 
made independently of candidates.112  Today, PACs remain an important 
and powerful vehicle for people to use to associate for the purposes of 
political spending.113
It took five more years for Congress to first "prohibit independent
expenditures by corporations and labor unions."114  The Taft-Hartley Act115
was Congress’s first attempt to limit political speech by political opponents.  
                                                                                                                 
 105. See Pendleton Civil Service Reform (Pendleton) Act, ch. 27, 22 Stat. 403 (1883). 
 106. CORRADO ET AL., supra note 83, at 16. 
 107. See id. (noting that the Hatch Act did not affect state and local government 
employees). 
 108. War Labor Disputes (Smith-Connally) Act, Pub. L. No. 78-89, 57 Stat. 163, 167 
(1943) (amending § 313 of the Corrupt Practices Act of 1925). 
 109. See SMITH, supra note 70, at 28 ("In 1943, in the wake of a bitter strike by the 
United Mine Workers, Republicans capitalized on fears that unchecked union power might 
damage the war effort, to pass the Smith-Connally Act."); see also Brief of Amicus 
Campaign Finance Scholars in Support of Appellant, Citizens United, Citizens United v. 
FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010) (No. 08-205), 2009 WL 2365206 at *10 (noting Congress passed 
the Smith-Connally Act to "secure defense production against work stoppages").   
 110. See discussion infra (noting unions circumvented Smith-Connally’s restrictions by 
establishing PACs). 
 111. SMITH, supra note 70, at 28. 
 112. Id. 
 113. See TORRES-SPELLISCY, supra note 32 (noting PACs raised $3.2 billion for all 
federal candidates during the 2008 U.S. federal election). 
 114. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 900 (2010) (emphasis added). 
 115. See Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 
§ 304, 61 Stat. 136, 159 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 251 (1946 ed., Supp. I)) (making ban on 
union contributions permanent and adding expenditure ban for both corporations and 
unions). 
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Original interpretations of the Taft-Hartley Act viewed it as preventing any 
political communication funded from union or corporate treasuries, 
"including, for example, an editorial endorsing a candidate in the union’s 
house newspaper."116  But, when the government indicted CIO News for 
publishing an editorial endorsing a Democratic candidate, labor unions 
quickly challenged the Act.117  Ultimately, the Supreme Court ruled that 
Congress did not intend the Act to ban such internal communications.118
Hence, the Supreme Court’s decision merely narrowed the Act’s reach 
without addressing its overall constitutionality.  Although President Truman 
"warned that the expenditure ban was a ‘dangerous intrusion on free 
speech,’" it took three more decades before the Court reached the 
constitutionality of restrictions on corporate and union expenditures.119
Throughout the twentieth century, money continued to play a large 
part in campaigns.120  And through loopholes in congressional regulations, 
corporations, unions, and wealthy independent donors successfully evaded 
Congress’s attempts at restricting campaign finance.121  Thus, attempting to 
achieve more effective and heavy-handed regulations, in the early 1970s, 
Congress passed, and amended, the Federal Elections Campaign Act 
(FECA).122  By retaining the Taft-Hartley restrictions on political funding 
from the general corporate treasury, Congress "expressed support for the 
                                                                                                                 
 116. SMITH, supra note 70, at 28 (discussing original interpretation of Taft-Hartley Act); 
see also Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 953 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part) ("In that Act passed more than 60 years ago, Congress extended the 
prohibition on corporate support of candidates to cover not only direct contributions, but 
independent expenditures as well."). 
 117. See SMITH, supra note 70, at 28. 
 118. See United States v. Cong. of Indus. Org., 335 U.S. 106, 123–24 (1948) ("We are 
unwilling to say that Congress by its prohibition against corporations or labor organizations 
making an ‘expenditure in connection with any election’ of candidates for federal office 
intended to outlaw such a publication.  We do not think § 313 reaches such a use of 
corporate or labor organization funds."). 
 119. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 900 (2010) (citing President Truman’s 
warning after Congress overrode his veto of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947).
 120. Infra Part II.B. 
 121. See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 953 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (noting that "[t]he bar on contributions ‘was being so narrowly construed’ 
that corporations were easily able to defeat the purposes of the [Taft-Hartley] Act by 
supporting candidates through other means" (quoting FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, 551 U.S. 
449, 511 (2007) (Souter, J., dissenting))).
 122. See Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) of 1971, 2 U.S.C. § 441 (1972), 
amended by 18 U.S.C. § 608(e) (1970 ed., Supp. V) (increasing disclosure of contributions 
for federal campaigns, placing legal limits on campaign contributions, and creating the 
Federal Election Commission).  
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principle that corporate and union political speech financed with PAC 
funds, collected voluntarily from the organization’s stockholders or 
members, receives greater protection than speech financed with general 
treasury funds."123  Passed to replace the FCPA, the FECA "significantly 
tightened disclosure requirements" by putting in place penalties for failing 
to make proper disclosures, and by limiting the total media spending in 
Congressional races, and capping the percent of that spending that could be 
dedicated to radio and television advertising.124  Notwithstanding these 
restrictions, § 441b(b) of the FECA codified the option for corporations and 
unions to create and use PACs for spending purposes that were otherwise 
forbidden to the corporation or union itself.125
Almost immediately after the 1974 amendments to the FECA, Buckley 
v. Valeo,126 challenged the constitutionality of the Act’s spending limits.  In 
its 1976 decision, "the Supreme Court examined the four key features of the 
congressional reform effort:  (1) disclosure requirements, (2) limits on 
campaign contributions, (3) limits on political expenditures, and (4) public 
financing of elections."127  The Buckley Court upheld the FECA’s 
disclosure provisions requiring political organizations or persons 
contributing to campaigns to reveal their identity.128
However, the real heart of the Buckley decision lies in the Court’s 
distinction between political expenditures and contributions.  Contributions 
are payments directed at a specific candidate or campaign.129  In contrast, 
expenditures are payments spent to support a political cause.130  While 
upholding limits on campaign contributions, the Buckley Court struck down 
limits on expenditures, for two reasons:  (1) "contributions were potentially 
far more dangerous to the integrity of the political process than 
                                                                                                                 
 123. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 954 (2010). 
 124. See SMITH, supra note 70, at 31 (discussing FECA’s disclosure provisions). 
 125. See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 954 (discussing PAC provision in FECA). 
 126. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 143 (1976) (per curiam) (concluding that certain 
limitations imposed by the FECA on campaign expenditures were an unconstitutional 
restriction on the freedom of expression). 
 127. RODNEY A. SMOLLA, FREE SPEECH IN AN OPEN SOCIETY 221–22 (Alfred A. Knopf, 
Inc. 1992). 
 128. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 61 ("We affirm the determination on overbreadth and 
hold that § 434(e), if narrowly construed, also is within constitutional bounds.").  
 129. See SMOLLA, supra note 127, at 222 ("Contributions are payments made to a 
political candidate or campaign fund or spent in coordination with the candidate’s campaign 
organization."). 
 130. See id. ("Expenditures, on the other hand, are sums spent directly by someone to 
foster a political cause."). 
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expenditures" and (2) "the Court regarded limits on contributions as 
significantly less intrusive incursions on free expression and association 
than limits on expenditures."131  Thus, the Court’s first constitutional 
endeavor into campaign finance restrictions recognized a "sufficiently 
important" governmental interest in preventing corruption and the 
appearance of corruption, with the caveat that restrictions that were not 
narrowly tailored to achieve this interest were unconstitutional.132  Notably, 
the Buckley Court was silent on whether "corporate expenditures could be 
treated differently from individual expenditures."133  Despite the Buckley
Court’s invalidation of the expenditure ban, which applied to corporations 
and unions, four months after the decision, Congress recodified § 610’s 
corporate and union expenditure ban at 2 U.S.C. § 441b.134  Section 441b135
was the independent expenditure restriction challenged in Citizens United v. 
FEC.136
B.  Constitutionality of Campaign Finance Restrictions Aimed at 
Corporations 
Buckley did not address the constitutionality of § 610’s separate ban on 
corporate and union expenditures.137  Yet, even in the Court’s early 
jurisprudence, the voluntariness of the support played an important role in 
resolving the cases.138  Despite this brief concern for shareholders’ rights 
                                                                                                                 
 131. Id.
 132. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 884 (majority opinion) (discussing the 
Buckley opinion). 
 133. Id. at 954 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  Justice Stevens 
argues that the Buckley Court’s silence on corporate expenditures "reinforced the 
understanding that corporate expenditures could be treated differently from individual 
expenditures."  Id.
 134. Compare id. at 883 (majority opinion) (concluding that Buckley invalidated the 
ban on corporate and union expenditures), with id. at 958 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) ("It is implausible to think, as the majority suggests, that Buckley covertly 
invalidated FECA’s separate corporate and union campaign expenditure restriction, § 
610 . . . , even though that restriction had been on the books for decades before Buckley and 
would remain on the books, undisturbed, for decades after."). 
 135. 2 U.S.C. § 441b (1976). 
 136. See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 913 (majority opinion) (overruling Austin and 
the part of McConnell that upheld BCRA § 203’s extension of § 441b’s restrictions on 
corporate independent expenditures). 
 137. Id. 
 138. Compare Pipefitters Local Union No. 562 v. United States, 407 U.S. 385, 409, 
414–15 (1972) (determining the statutory bar on corporate and union spending does not 
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and expansive corporate influence, the Court did not specifically consider 
the constitutionality of the political spending rights of corporations until its 
decision in First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti.139
Bellotti first considered the argument that the state may justify certain 
limitations on corporate speech because it has a legitimate and compelling 
interest in protecting corporate shareholders.140  In Bellotti, a corporate 
bank, in conjunction with national banking associations and business 
corporations, challenged a Massachusetts statute that prohibited business 
associations and corporations from political spending intended to influence 
issue referenda not materially related to the business.141  Further, the statute 
imposed a criminal penalty on violating corporations.142  The Bank 
challenged the statute as a violation of its First Amendment rights.143
                                                                                                                 
apply to "the voluntary donations of employees," when maintained in a separate account, 
because "[t]he dominant [legislative] concern in requiring that contributions be voluntary 
was, after all, to protect the dissenting stockholder or union member"), with United States v. 
Int’l Union United Auto., Aircraft & Agric. Implement Workers of Am., 352 U.S. 567, 592 
(1957) (remanding case to the district court and advising it to consider whether the broadcast 
in question was being "paid for out of the general dues of the union membership or 
[whether] the funds [could] be fairly said to have obtained on a voluntary basis"), and United 
States v. Cong. of Indus. Org., 335 U.S. 106, 123–24 (1948) (noting expenditure bar may not 
cover funds voluntarily contributed by union members or corporate stockholders for election 
purposes). 
 139. First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 784 (1978) ("We thus find no 
support in the First or Fourteenth Amendment, or in the decisions of this Court, for the 
proposition that speech that otherwise would be within the protection of the First 
Amendment loses that protections simply because its source is a corporation.").  But cf.
Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 954 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (discussing that the opinions in both Pipefitters and Automobile Workers
"expressed support for the principle that corporate and union political speech financed with 
PAC funds, collected voluntarily from the organization’s stockholders or members, receives 
greater protection than speech financed with general treasury funds"). 
 140. See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 786 ("Especially where, as here, a prohibition is directed 
at speech itself, and the speech is intimately related to the process of governing, ‘the State 
may prevail only upon showing a subordinating interest which is compelling’ . . . ." (quoting 
Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960))). 
 141. Id. at 767–68.  Specifically, the statute prohibited corporations from: 
[M]aking contributions or expenditures "for the purpose of . . . influencing or 
affecting the vote on any question submitted to the voters, other than one 
materially affecting any of the property, business or assets of the corporation."  
The statute further specifie[d] that "[n]o question submitted to voters solely 
concerning the taxation of the income, property or transactions of individuals 
shall be deemed materially to affect the property, business or assets of the 
corporation." 
Id.
 142. Id. at 768. 
 143. Id. at 770. 
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Rejecting the argument that the First Amendment does not protect corporate 
speech immaterial to its business or property, the Bellotti Court deemed the 
statute an unconstitutional violation of the First Amendment’s freedom of 
expression.144  After concluding the statute infringed on the corporation’s 
freedom of expression, the Court subjected the statute to strict scrutiny 
analysis.145  The State asserted a compelling governmental interest in 
protecting dissenting shareholders whose views differed from the views 
expressed by corporate management.146  Dismissing the shareholder 
interest, the Court deemed the particular statute both too broad and too 
narrow to constitute a substantially relevant correlation between the 
governmental interest in protecting shareholders and its actual effect.147
Finally, the Bellotti Court also failed to address the constitutionality of the 
State’s ban on corporate independent expenditures supporting candidates.148
1.  Federal Election Commission v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life149
FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life (MCFL), first 
addressed corporate expenditures soliciting support for specific 
                                                                                                                 
 144. See id. at 777 ("If the speakers here were not corporations, no one would suggest 
that the State could silence their proposed speech."). 
 145. Id. at 786–87. 
 146. Id. at 787. 
 147. See id. at 795 (finding that the portion of the statute is invalid because it 
"prohibit[ed] protected speech in a manner unjustified by a compelling state interest").  The 
shareholder argument received significantly more favorable analysis in Justice White’s 
dissenting opinion.  Comparing the effect of corporate political spending on shareholders to 
the effect of compelling union contributions that are subsequently used for political 
purposes, Justice White found identical Massachusetts’s shareholder protection interest and 
the state interest upheld by the Court in Abood. See id. at 815–16 (White, J., dissenting) 
(noting the right against compelled speech is a right that has been previously protected by 
the Court under the First Amendment).  That interest is "the right to adhere to one’s own 
beliefs and to refuse to support the dissemination of the personal and political views of 
others, regardless of how large a majority they may compose."  Id.  He further noted that 
"First Amendment concerns of stockholders are directly implicated, [ ] when a corporation 
chooses to use its privileged status to finance ideological crusades which are unconnected 
with the corporate business or property and which some shareholders might not wish to 
support."  Id.
 148. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 884 (2010) (stating that "a single 
Bellotti footnote purported to leave the question open" regarding independent expenditures, 
including those made by corporations). 
 149. See FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life (MCFL), 479 U.S. 238, 251–53, 263 (1986) 
(holding, notwithstanding MCFL’s violation of § 441b, the PAC requirement 
unconstitutionally burdens First Amendment rights of the small nonprofit). 
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candidates.150  In this case, the defendant, Massachusetts Citizens for 
Life (Citizens for Life), was a nonprofit, nonstock corporation organized 
exclusively to advance anti-abortion efforts.151  Notwithstanding Citizens 
for Life’s small size and explicit nonprofit, prolife agenda, Citizens for 
Life’s organization as a corporation subjected it to a federal statute 
requiring corporations making independent campaign expenditures to do so 
through PACs, rather than through the general corporate treasury.152  Thus, 
when Citizens for Life began publishing a newsletter advising contributors 
and noncontributors of which politicians in the upcoming election were pro-
choice, the FEC filed a civil complaint against Citizens for Life under 
§ 441b.153
The Supreme Court first held that Citizens for Life’s publication and 
distribution of the candidate advocacy violated § 441b because it 
constituted express advocacy.154  However, the Court went on to hold that 
§ 441b’s speech prohibition was unconstitutional as applied to Citizens for 
Life because Citizens for Life was more akin to a voluntary political 
association than a business firm.155  Therefore, the corporation should not 
have to undergo the extra burden of establishing a PAC.156  In short, the 
compelling state interest in restricting the influence of political war chests 
funneled through the corporate form does not apply in this case because 
"[Citizens for Life] is not the type of ‘traditional corporatio[n] organized for 
economic gain,’ that has been the focus of regulation of corporate political 
activity."157
MCFL stands for the proposition that some types of corporations 
cannot be restricted from using their general treasury funds for independent 
expenditures.158  However, the Court acknowledged that apart from this 
                                                                                                                 
 150. See id. at 241 (discussing the issue of whether a corporation can use its general 
corporate treasury to make an expenditure in connection with a federal election).  
 151. See id. at 241–42 (describing MCFL).
 152. See id. at 253 (noting that because MCFL is incorporated, it must establish a 
separate fund if it wishes to engage in any independent spending).  Moreover, such separate 
fund is considered a political committee and thus, MCFL must comply with additional 
statutory requirements.  Id.
 153. Id. at 242–45. 
 154. Id. at 251–53. 
 155. See id. at 259–60 (distinguishing MCFL from for-profit corporations). 
 156. Id. at 263 ("While the burden on MCFL’s speech is not insurmountable, we cannot
permit it to be imposed without a constitutionally adequate justification."). 
 157. See id. at 259–60 (distinguishing MCFL from profit-making corporations). 
 158. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 955 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part) ("What the [MCFL] Court held by a 5-to-4 vote was that a 
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limited class of corporations, "[t]he Government has a legitimate interest in 
‘regulat[ing] the substantial aggregations of wealth amassed by the special 
advantages which go with the corporate form,’" because "[t]hose 
aggregations can distort the ‘free trade in ideas’ crucial to candidate 
elections, [ ] at the expense of members or shareholders who may disagree 
with the object of the expenditures."159  Consequently, MCFL
acknowledges that protecting dissenting shareholders supports 
governmental regulation of the general treasuries of corporations.160
Further, when protecting shareholders from compelled political spending is 
not a concern—as it was not with Citizens for Life, the corporation’s 
interest in unrestricted spending outweighs the government’s interest in 
regulating spending.161
2.  Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce162
Although MCFL was a rather limited holding, the holding proved both 
good and bad for corporate political spending advocates.163  On the one 
hand, Justice Brennan’s opinion for the Court "seemed to embrace the 
validity of the leveling theory, at least as applied to corporate wealth."164
                                                                                                                 
limited class of corporations must be allowed to use their general treasury funds for 
independent expenditures . . . ."); see also FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life (MCFL), 479 U.S. 
238, 259 (1986) ("Groups such as MCFL, however, do not pose that danger of corruption.  
MCFL was formed to disseminate political ideas, not to amass capital."). 
 159. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. at 955 (quoting MCFL, 479 U.S. at 257–60).
 160. See id. (noting MCFL recognized a legitimate governmental interest in regulating 
the great wealth amassed by the corporate form). 
 161. See supra note 158 and accompanying text. 
 162. See Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 655 (1990) ("Although 
we agree that expressive rights are implicated in this case, we hold that application of § 
54(1) to the Chamber is constitutional because the provision is narrowly tailored to serve a 
compelling state interest."). 
 163. See MCFL, 479 U.S. at 263 (acknowledging the rationale behind the restriction of 
corporations’ independent spending, but limiting the extension of that rationale).  "We 
acknowledge the legitimacy of Congress’ concern that organizations that amass great wealth 
in the economic marketplace not gain unfair advantage in the political marketplace."  Id.  
However, "that justification does not extend uniformly to all corporations.  Some 
corporations have features more akin to voluntary political associations than business firms, 
and therefore should not have to bear burdens on independent spending solely because of 
their incorporated status."  Id.
 164. See SMOLLA, supra note 127, at 227–28 (noting the MCFL Court stated that 
"‘[d]irect corporate spending on political activity raises the prospect that resources amassed 
in the economic marketplace may be used to provide an unfair advantage in the political 
marketplace’"). 
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But, on the other hand, MCFL had also found too great a burden on free 
speech as applied to a nonprofit corporation like Citizens for Life, thus 
affirming the First Amendment rights of corporations.165  Whatever the 
victory for so-called "corporate speech," it was short-lived, because less 
than five years later, the Supreme Court, per Justice Marshall, delivered a 
huge blow to corporate political spending rights in Austin v. Michigan 
Chamber of Commerce.166
 In Austin, the Supreme Court upheld a state law prohibiting 
corporate expenditures supporting or opposing any candidate for state 
office, unless the expenditure was made through a segregated fund or 
PAC.167  Like Citizens for Life, the Michigan Chamber of Commerce 
(Chamber) was a nonprofit corporation.168  But, unlike Citizens for Life, 
three-quarters of the Chamber’s 8,000 members were for-profit 
corporations.169  Thus, the Chamber’s business-friendly purpose, in 
conjunction with receiving annual funding through required membership 
dues, distinguished it from the small, pro-life, non-profit corporation in 
MCFL.170
                                                                                                                 
 165. See FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life (MCFL), 479 U.S. 238, 263 (1986) (stating that 
MCFL is not the type of corporation that merits this burden on free speech).  
[MCFL] does not pose such a threat at all.  Voluntary political associations do 
not suddenly present the specter of corruption merely by assuming the corporate 
form.  Given this fact, the rationale for restricting core political speech in this 
case is simply the desire for a bright-line rule.  This hardly constitutes the 
compelling state interest necessary to justify any infringement on First 
Amendment freedom.  
Id.
 166. See Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 655 (1990) ("Although 
we agree that expressive rights are implicated in this case, we hold that application of § 
54(1) to the Chamber is constitutional because the provision is narrowly tailored to serve a 
compelling state interest."). 
 167. See id. at 654–55 (explaining the state statute and upholding its constitutionality).  
 168. Compare id. at 656 (describing the Chamber as a "nonprofit Michigan 
corporation"), with MCFL, 479 U.S. at 241–42 (describing MCFL as a small nonprofit 
corporation). 
 169. Austin, 494 U.S. at 656.
 170. See id. at 661–62 (distinguishing the nonprofit corporation in MCFL from the 
Chamber).  The Austin Court pointed to three characteristics that were essential to its 
holding in MCFL:
The first characteristic of Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., that 
distinguished it from ordinary business corporations was that the organization 
"was formed for the express purpose of promoting political ideas, and cannot 
engage in business activities." . . . We described the second feature of MCFL as 
the absence of "shareholders or other persons affiliated so as to have a claim on 
its assets or earnings. This ensures that persons connected with the organization 
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Applying the Buckley test to determine whether Michigan’s 
restrictions on corporate political expenditures may constitutionally be 
applied to the Chamber, the Austin Court queried the burden on the 
Chamber’s speech and whether the statute was narrowly tailored.171  As to 
the constitutional burden, the Austin Court concluded Michigan’s PAC 
requirement "burdens the Chamber’s exercise of expression because ‘the 
corporation is not free to use its general funds for campaign advocacy 
purposes.’"172  Thus, while not completely stifling corporate speech, the 
restriction sufficiently burdens the Chamber’s First Amendment rights such 
that they must be "justified by a compelling state interest."173  Next, the 
Austin Court found that the regulation aimed to limit political corruption by 
minimizing political spending that is uncorrelated to "the public’s support 
for the corporation’s political ideas."174  Noting the corporate structure is 
unique in that state-conferred benefits allow corporations to amass large 
treasuries,175 the Austin Court concluded that the unfair influence of 
corporate wealth similarly affects elections for political contributions and
independent expenditures.176  Thus, the Austin Court held that the State’s 
interest in regulating corporate expenditures was a "sufficiently compelling 
rationale to support its restriction on independent expenditures by 
                                                                                                                 
will have no economic disincentive for disassociating with it if they disagree 
with its political activity." . . . The final characteristic upon which we relied in 
MCFL was the organization’s independence from the influence of business 
corporations. 
Id. at 661–64. 
 171. See id. at 657 (applying the Buckley test to the Michigan regulation). 
 172. Id. at 658 (quoting FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238, 252 (1986)). 
 173. Id. at 658 ("Michigan’s regulation aims at . . . corruption in the political arena:  the 
corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with 
the help of the corporate form and that have little or no correlation to the public’s support for 
the corporation’s political ideas.").  Id. at 659–60. 
 174. Id. at 659–60. 
 175. See id. at 658–59 (noting that "[s]tate law grants corporations special advantages—
such as limited liability, perpetual life, and favorable treatment of the accumulation and 
distribution of assets—that enhance their ability to attract capital and to deploy their 
resources in ways that maximize the return on their shareholders’ investments").  "These 
state-created advantages not only allow corporations to play a dominant role in the Nation’s 
economy, but also permit them to use ‘resources amassed in the economic marketplace’ to 
obtain ‘an unfair advantage in the political marketplace’"  Id. at 659 (quoting MCFL, 479 
U.S. at 257).  
 176. See id. at 660 ("Corporate wealth can unfairly influence elections when it is 
deployed in the form of independent expenditures, just as it can when it assumes the guise of 
political contributions."). 
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corporations."177  Finally, the Court found § 441b was narrowly tailored to 
achieve this interest in minimizing corruption because the BCRA allowed 
corporations to make political expenditures through a PAC.178  Again 
focusing on the voluntariness of political expenditures made through PACs, 
the Austin Court hailed PACs as accurately reflecting contributors’ support 
for the corporation’s political views.179
3.  McConnell v. Federal Election Commission180
The Court has reaffirmed Austin’s holding and rationale several times 
in the twenty years since the decision.  Most importantly to the Court’s 
recent decision in Citizens United was its affirmation of Austin in 
McConnell v. FEC.  In McConnell, the Court upheld § 203 of the BCRA, 
the same provision challenged and subsequently overruled in Citizens 
United.181  Section 203 was Congress’s response to the corporations and 
unions that evaded the expenditure restrictions by advocating the election or 
defeat of political candidates without using "magic words."  These magic 
words were the words that the Buckley Court had held distinguished 
contributions, which could be regulated, from expenditures, which could 
not be regulated.182  By exploiting this loophole, corporations and unions 
were spending "hundreds of millions of dollars of their general treasury 
                                                                                                                 
 177. Id.
 178. Id. at 660. 
 179. See id. at 660–61 ("Because persons contributing to such funds understand that 
their money will be used solely for political purposes, the speech generated accurately 
reflects contributors’ support for the corporation’s political views."). 
 180. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 206 (2003) (upholding § 203 of the BCRA).  
 181. Compare Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 913 (2010) (overruling "BCRA 
§ 203’s extension of § 441b’s restrictions on corporate independent expenditures"), with 
McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 204–09 (2003) (plurality opinion), overruled by Citizens 
United, 130 S. Ct. at 913–14 (upholding § 203 of BCRA prohibiting corporations and unions 
from using their general treasury funds to finance electioneering communications).  BCRA § 
203 amends FECA § 316(b)(2) restricting corporations’ and labor unions’ spending on 
electioneering communications.  McConnell, 540 U.S. at 190.  "Thus, under BCRA, 
corporations and unions may not use their general treasury funds to finance electioneering 
communications, but they remain free to organize and administer segregated funds, or PACs, 
for that purpose."  Id. at 204. 
 182. See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 956 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (discussing how the Buckley Court narrowly interpreted the term 
"expenditures" "to avoid any problems of constitutional vagueness, holding it applicable 
only to ‘communications that expressly advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified 
candidate’" (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 80 (1976))).
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funds for these ads."183  Congress responded by passing § 203 to prohibit 
"corporations and unions from using general treasury funds for 
electioneering communications that ‘refe[r] to a clearly identified 
candidate,’ whether or not those communications use the magic words."184
Unlike the Citizens United Court, the McConnell Court found this provision 
of the BCRA satisfied the compelling governmental interests in "preserving 
the integrity of the electoral process, preventing corruption, . . . ‘sustaining 
the active, alert responsibility of the individual citizen in a democracy for 
the wise conduct of the government,’ [and maintaining] the individual 
citizen’s confidence in government."185
This history of campaign finance regulation and the Court’s 
willingness to uphold many political spending restrictions renders the 
Citizens United Court’s decision all the more dramatic.186  Furthermore, 
given the many State interests the Court historically has held justify 
campaign-spending restrictions, the Citizens United Court’s rejection of § 
203 was particularly surprising.187  Further, the precedents that the Court 
overruled rest, not only on principles of election regulation, but also on 
established doctrines in corporate law, securities law, and most 
importantly—the forced speech doctrine.188
                                                                                                                 
 183. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 957 (quoting McConnell, 540 U.S. at 127).  "After 
Buckley, corporations and unions figured out how to circumvent the limits on express 
advocacy by using sham ‘issue ads’ that ‘eschewed the use of magic words’ but nonetheless 
‘advocate[d] the election or defeat of clearly identified federal candidates.’"  Id. at 956–57 
(quoting McConnell, 540 U.S. at 126).   
 184. Id. at 957 (quoting 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(A)(i)(I) (2010)). 
 185. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 206–07 n.88 (2003) (quoting First Nat’l Bank of 
Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 788–89 (1978)). 
 186. See, e.g., FEC v. Wisc. Right to Life (WRTL), 551 U.S. 449, 470 (2007) (holding 
government could regulate corporate communication under § 203 only if it was "susceptible 
of no reasonable interpretation other than as an appeal to vote for or against a specific 
candidate"), and McConnell, 540 U.S. at 204–09 (upholding § 203 of BCRA prohibiting 
corporations and unions from using their general treasury funds to finance electioneering 
communications); see also FEC v. Nat’l Right to Work Comm. (NRWC), 459 U.S. 197, 209–
10 (1982) (upholding congressional legislation barring nonprofit corporations from soliciting 
nonmembers for PAC funds). 
 187. See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 930 (2010) (Stevens, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (discussing historical precedent for corporate 
spending regulations).
 188. See discussion infra Part III. 
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III.  Forced Speech Doctrine 
As discussed in Part II(B), the Austin Court distinguished the Chamber 
from Citizens for Life by noting the absence of shareholders.189  The 
absence of shareholders was important to the Court because assuring other 
persons do not have a claim on the corporation’s earnings avoids the forced 
speech problems associated with the economic disincentives involved in 
disassociating for dissenting shareholders.190  This shareholder distinction 
was important to the Austin Court because it was concerned with forcing 
the Chamber’s members to speak in violation of the First Amendment.191
First Amendment jurisprudence embraces a small category of cases dealing 
with what is termed the "Forced Speech Doctrine."192  The forced speech 
doctrine rests on the idea that the First Amendment protects those who wish 
to speak as well as those who wish to abstain from speaking.193  And just as 
the Court has held that monetary contributions constitute protected speech 
under the First Amendment,194 the forced speech doctrine holds that the 
First Amendment protects individuals from being compelled to speak 
through their involuntary contribution of funds.195  Several cases deal with 
                                                                                                                 
 189. See Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 663 (1990) (noting one 
feature the Court had described of MCFL was the "absence of ‘shareholders or other persons 
affiliated so as to have a claim on its assets or earnings’").  The Austin Court went on to 
compare the Chamber’s members to shareholders stating that "[a]lthough the 
Chamber . . . lacks shareholders, many of its members may be similarly reluctant to 
withdraw as members even if they disagree with the Chamber’s political expression, because 
they wish to benefit from the Chamber’s nonpolitical programs and to establish contacts 
with the other members of the business community."  Id.
 190. See id. at 663 ("This ensures that persons connected with the organization will 
have no economic disincentive for disassociating with it if they disagree with its political 
activity" (quoting FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life (MCFL), 479 U.S. 238, 264 (1986)).  
 191. See id. at 663–65 (discussing disincentives and potential forced speech 
implications for Chamber members who disagree with the corporation’s political speech).
 192. See VICTOR BRUDNEY, Compelled Speech, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTION 475, 475 (Leonard W. Levy & Kenneth L. Karst eds., MacMillan Reference 
USA 2d ed. 2000) ("The First Amendment mandates that ‘Congress shall make no 
law . . . abridging the freedom of speech’ implies a stricture against compelling or coercing 
persons to engage in speech they do not wish to make—either because they disagree with the 
speech or because they wish to remain silent.").  
 193. See id. at 475 ("Substantially the same considerations that drive the prohibition 
against abridgement of Freedom of Speech—whether derived from the notion of the 
speaker’s autonomy or from the listener’s entitlement or the societal value of undistorted 
public discourse—drive the strictures against coercion of speech.").
 194. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 22–23 (1976) (per curiam) (reasoning that 
limiting the freedom to contribute "implicate[s] fundamental First Amendment interests"). 
 195. See BRUDNEY, supra note 192, at 475 ("Protected speech may also consist of the 
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compelled expression,196 but, for the purposes of this Note, the category of 
cases dealing with compelled subsidization of private expression is the most 
pertinent, because these cases relate to the compelled speech arguably 
affecting shareholders after Citizens United.197
A.  Abood v. Detroit Board of Education198
The Supreme Court first examined compelled ideological and political 
speech by private actors in a 1977 case—Abood v. Detroit Board of 
Education.199  In Abood, nonunion public school teachers challenged an 
agreement between the state and unions requiring the teachers, as a 
condition of their employment, to pay a service fee.200  The objecting 
teachers alleged that the union’s use of their fees to engage in political 
speech violated their freedom of association guaranteed by the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments.201  Relying on two previous decisions regarding 
collective-bargaining agreements, the Abood Court found a valid exercise 
of the agency-shop agreement to the extent that the union used the service 
charge to finance union expenditures "for the purposes of collective 
bargaining, contract administration, and grievance adjustment."202
Consequently, although the agency-shop agreement inevitably 
impacted the employees’ First and Fourteenth Amendment rights, in the 
context of union spending promoting union causes, the compelled dues 
were permissible.203  However, the Abood Court drew a line between 
                                                                                                                 
contribution of funds or furnishing of facilities to be used by the recipients, inter alia, for 
expressive conduct (i.e., the contribution may be assimilated to speech of the contributor)."). 
 196. See Howard M. Wasserman, Compelled Expression and the Public Forum 
Doctrine, 77 TUL. L. REV. 163, 169 (2002) (discussing four categories of compelled 
expression). 
 197. See discussion infra Part III.C (discussing forced speech cases). 
 198. See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 235–36 (1977) (holding 
Constitution requires that nonunion employees are not required to pay dues to union to 
further disagreeable political and ideological speech). 
 199. See id.
 200. See id. at 212–13 (describing the nonunion teachers’ complaint that they opposed 
collective bargaining in the public sector and that the Union is engaged in activities of which 
they do not approve). 
 201. Id. at 213. 
 202. Id. at 225–26. 
 203. See Wasserman, supra note 196, at 174–75 ("As long as the union used the fees to 
promote those causes for which it was formed and for which it brought members together, an 
individual payer could not withdraw financial support merely because she disagreed with the 
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contributing funds for political purposes germane to the union’s duties as a 
collective bargaining representative, and contributions not germane to such 
representation.204  For those political and ideological causes that were not 
germane to the union’s duties, the Abood Court held that the State could not 
require an individual payor to have her funds used to advance these ideas.205
The Abood Court’s solution in such cases of objection "would be restitution 
to the objecting employee of a fraction of her union dues, equal to the 
fraction of total union expenditures that were made for the impermissible 
objectionable political purposes."206  Consequently, Abood stands for the 
proposition that mandatory dues used to fund political and ideological 
causes unrelated to the organization’s duties constitute forced speech in 
violation of the First Amendment. 
B.  Keller v. State Bar of California207
The Court extended the principles established in Abood to the 
mandatory dues paid by attorneys to a state bar.208  In Keller v. State Bar of 
California, the Supreme Court held that the State Bar of California (Bar) 
could constitutionally use mandatory membership dues to fund activities 
germane to the state’s goals of regulating the legal profession and of 
improving the quality of legal services.209  However, the Bar could not use 
mandatory dues to fund ideological activities not germane to the Bar’s 
goals.210
                                                                                                                 
group’s contract strategy.").  "This was true even if all the union’s activities could be 
regarded, in some sense, as political."  Id. at 175. 
 204. See id. at 175 (discussing distinction between germane and non-germane political 
expenditures). 
 205. See id. (discussing unconstitutionality of compelling payment for disagreeable 
causes); see also Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 235–36 (1977) ("[T]he 
Constitution requires only that such expenditures be financed from charges, dues, or 
assessments paid by employees who do not object to advancing those ideas and who are not 
coerced into doing so against their will by the threat of loss of governmental employment.").  
 206. Wasserman, supra note 196, at 175. 
 207. See Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1, 2 (1990) (holding State Bar’s use of 
compulsory dues to finance political and ideological activities with which members 
disagreed violated their First Amendment right of free speech when such expenditures were 
"not necessarily or reasonably incurred for the purpose of regulating the legal profession or 
improving the quality of legal services"). 
 208. See id.
 209. Id. at 13–15. 
 210. Id.
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The forced speech doctrine established in Abood/Keller holds that the 
First Amendment protects dissenting individuals from (1) compulsory 
payments (2) used to support political or ideological causes (3) not germane 
to the organization’s mission.  Part III(C) of this Note argues that the forced 
speech doctrine should have been an important consideration for the Court 
in Citizens United.
C.  Shareholders and Forced Speech 
The protections against forced speech established in Abood—and 
later in Keller—have not been extended to shareholders.211  Yet, 
dissenting shareholders are in many ways similarly situated to the 
dissenting union and bar members.212  Similar to the union and bar 
members, shareholders are contributing their money to a cause from 
which they expect to realize some benefit.213  Consequently, 
shareholders are purchasing a stake in a corporation.214  Although 
shareholders typically benefit monetarily from this stake, some 
shareholders may genuinely want to support the corporation.215
Corporations then use shareholders’ money to run the business.  
Therefore, when corporations spend money on political or ideological 
electioneering, they are—just like unions and bar associations—
spending their contributors’ money.  Part IV(A) argues that to the 
extent a dissenting shareholder faces federal or state penalties for 
selling her stock in a corporation financing disagreeable political or 
ideological electioneering, the forced speech doctrine should protect 
the dissenting shareholder from these financial penalties.  The Court 
                                                                                                                 
 211. See Wasserman, supra note 196, at 176–77 (noting arguments have been made to 
extend protections of free speech to dissenting shareholders, but that the argument "has 
never attained a majority of the Court"). 
 212. See id. at 176 (stating that "corporate expressive expenditures using invested 
moneys of shareholders who object to the corporation’s message" is a "superficially similar 
situation" with that of the dissenting nonunion teachers in Abood). 
 213. See HAMILTON & BOOTH, supra note 23, at 278–79 (describing role of the 
shareholder in the corporation). 
 214. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1500 (9th ed. 2009) (defining "shareholder" as 
"[o]ne who owns or holds a share or shares in a company, esp. a corporation"). 
 215. "Social Funds" is an example of a website devoted to providing shareholders with 
information about socially responsible investing options.  See SOCIAL FUNDS,
http://www.socialfunds.com/ (last visited Oct. 28, 2010) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
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has addressed this argument several times;216 but, "[t]he compelled-
shareholder argument has never attained a majority of the Court."217
IV.   Proposal for Remedying Dissenting Shareholders Forced Speech 
Concerns After Citizens United 
A.  State Action:  Laying the Groundwork for Extending the Speech 
Protections to Dissenting Shareholders 
The first step in establishing a violation of the forced speech doctrine 
requires the dissenting shareholder to prove that her payments were 
compulsory.  Moreover, the compulsion must result from some form of 
state action.218  At first blush, the compulsion dissenting shareholders face 
seems to lack the state action necessary to bring corporate political 
spending within the protections of the First Amendment.  For example, in 
Abood, state law required individuals to pay money to the union.219
Similarly, in Keller, attorneys were only allowed to practice law in 
California if they joined, and paid dues to the Bar.220   In contrast, 
shareholders are generally not governmentally compelled to invest in the 
corporations.221  Nevertheless, this Part argues that the tax consequences 
                                                                                                                 
 216. See, e.g., FEC v. Nat’l Right to Work Comm. (NRWC), 459 U.S. 197, 207–08 
(1982) (recognizing a governmental interest in "protect[ing] the individuals who have paid 
money into a corporation or union for purposes other than the support of candidates from 
having that money used to support political candidates to whom they may be opposed"). 
 217. Wasserman, supra note 196, at 177. 
 218. See Hudgens v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 424 U.S. 507, 513 (1976) ("It is, of 
course, a commonplace that the constitutional guarantee of free speech is a guarantee only 
against abridgement by government, federal or state."). 
 219. See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 212–14 (1977) (describing 
mandatory union dues). 
 220. Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1, 4 (1990). 
 221. But see What Is the PST Retirement Program?, SAVINGS PLUS PROGRAM
https://www.nrsservicecenter.com/iApp/ret/content/employee.do?Site=SPPFORU&Role=EE
&currentTopNode=PST%20Program (last visited Oct. 28, 2010) (describing mandatory 
retirement system) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social 
Justice).  This mandatory retirement program for California state employees invests in a 
diversified portfolio of investments, including "guaranteed investment contracts (GICs) 
issued by major, high quality insurance and financial companies, and U.S. Treasury or 
agency securities and other high quality fixed income assets."  SHORT TERM INVESTMENT 
FUND—PST 1 (Dwight Asset Management Company 2009), available at https://www.nrsser 
vicecenter.com/content/media/retail/pdfs/SPPFORU/PST_Profile.pdf.  Thus, by requiring 
California public employees to invest in a retirement savings plan that invests in 
corporations, California’s retirement scheme satisfies the state action doctrine.  
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involved in prematurely selling certain types of investment accounts 
constitutes a governmentally created financial burden on the dissenting 
shareholder who wishes to sell the offending shares.  In some instances, the 
financial burden is so great that notwithstanding the injury to her speech, no 
reasonable shareholder would sell her shares.  Thus, this Note argues that 
when governmentally created penalties on premature divestment 
unreasonably restrict a dissenting shareholder’s ability to divest, the 
penalties serve as a de facto mandate that the shareholder maintain 
ownership of her shares, even when such ownership offends her freedom of 
speech. 
Critics of extending the forced speech doctrine to protect dissenting 
shareholders argue that shareholders are not compelled to retain the stock, 
or as Justice Stevens explains, the argument goes that, "If and when 
shareholders learn that a corporation has been spending general treasury 
money on objectionable electioneering, they can divest."222  This argument 
is also referred to as "the Wall Street Rule," 223 but as this Part will explain, 
for certain types of investments, the Wall Street rule cannot eradicate forced 
speech concerns.. The Wall Street rule fails to effectively remedy forced 
speech because dissenting shareholders would rarely accept the significant 
financial penalties assessed for premature divestment.224
Retirement accounts,225 particularly defined contribution (DC) 
plans,226 and defined benefit (DB) plans227 present these concerns.  
                                                                                                                 
 222. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 978 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part). 
 223. See Jean Helwege et al., Voting with Their Feet or Activism?  Institutional 
Investors’ Impact on CEO Turnover, 68 J. FIN. ECON. 3, 4 (discussing the Wall Street rule).  
The Wall Street rule reflects the theory that shareholders "implicitly praise or criticize 
management, by buying or selling [stock], but seldom get involved more directly, even to 
the extent of a phone call."  Id. 
 224. See discussion infra (outlining various early divestment penalties). 
 225. See J. MARTIN BURKE & MICHAEL K. FRIEL, UNDERSTANDING FEDERAL INCOME 
TAXATION 91 (LexisNexis, 3d ed. 2008) (defining individual retirement accounts).  "As an 
encouragement to savings and investment, principally for retirement purposes, Congress has 
authorized tax-favored devices commonly known as ‘IRAs’ (individual retirement accounts 
or annuities) to which taxpayers may make annual contributions."  Id.  As a major tax 
incentive, IRAs are not subject to taxes until they are distributed.  Id.       
 226. See Jennifer S. Taub, Able but Not Willing:  The Failure of Mutual Fund Advisors 
to Advocate for Shareholders’ Rights, 34 J. CORP. L. 843, 851 (2009) (defining a defined 
contribution (DC) plan).  It is a retirement channel through which a participating employee 
"is considered a ‘plan participant’ and merely directs the plan to make investments of his or 
her pre-tax wages in accordance with his or her instructions."  Id.  Furthermore, "[i]n this 
structure, the plan participant is the investor who takes the economic risk, but he or she is 
not the legal owner of the mutual fund or the underlying portfolio companies."  Id.
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Employers offering their employees retirement benefits favor "qualified 
plans"228 for their tremendous tax advantages.229  Although employees are 
generally not required to take advantage of this sizeable financial benefit,230
the financial incentives of such a plan often compel the employee to 
participate.231  Retirement benefits structured as 401(k) plans penalize 
investors who prematurely sell the fund.232  Early divestment results in an 
additional ten percent tax penalty for distributing the benefit before 
reaching the age of fifty-nine and a half.233  This tax penalty is in addition to 
regular income taxes.234  Money-Zine provides a useful example for how 
this penalty works: 
                                                                                                                 
 227. See id. (defining defined benefit (DB) plans as retirement plans promising an 
employee a set amount calculated according to established variables). 
 228. See HAMILTON & BOOTH, supra note 23, at 80–82 (noting qualified plans are those 
meeting requirements of the federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) 
and the Internal Revenue Code (IRC)).  
 229. See id. ("A [qualified] plan provides for a much greater degree of tax deferral than 
a plan financed with after-tax dollars, because no tax is imposed on either the contributions 
or the buildup until the employee retires (unless the funds are withdrawn before 
retirement)."); see also I.R.C. § 401 (2010) (defining "Qualified pension, profit-sharing, and 
stock bonus plans" as "[a] trust created or organized in the United States and forming part of 
a stock bonus, pension, or profit-sharing plan of an employer for the exclusive benefit of his 
employees or their beneficiaries"). 
 230. See INV. CO. INST., 2009 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK 96 (49th ed. 2009), 
available at http://www.ici.org/pdf/2009_factbook.pdf ("On an asset-weighted basis, the 
average total expense ratio incurred on 401(k) participants’ holdings of stock mutual funds 
through their 401(k) plans was 0.74 percent in 2007, compared with an average total expense 
ratio of 0.85 percent for stock mutual funds industrywide.").  Investors benefit from 
investing their money in 401(k) stock mutual funds over stock mutual funds that are not 
designated as 401(k)s.  Id.
 231. See id. at 86.  ("Eighty-two million, or 70 percent of, U.S. households report that 
they had employer-sponsored retirement plans, IRAs, or both in May 2008 . . . .").  "Sixty-
one percent of U.S. households reported that they had assets in DC plan accounts, were 
receiving or expecting to receive benefits from DB plans, or both.  Forty-one percent of 
households reported having assets in IRAs.  Thirty-two percent of households had both IRAs 
and employer-sponsored retirement plans."  Id.   
 232. See id. at 90 ("At the end of 2008, employer-sponsored DC plans—which include 
401(k) plans, 403(b) plans, 457 plans, Keoghs, and other DC plans—held an estimated $3.5 
trillion in assets . . . [and] [w]ith $2.4 trillion in assets at year-end 2008, 401(k) plans held 
the largest share of employer-sponsored DC plan assets.").  Similar to 401(k) plans, 403(b) 
and 457 plans "held another $712 billion in assets.  The remaining $455 billion in DC plan 
assets were held by other DC plans without 401(k) features."  Id. 
 233. Publication 575, IRS, http://www.irs.gov/publications/p575/ar02.html#en_US_ 
publink1000226952 (last viewed on Oct. 20, 2010) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 234. See 401(k) Plans:  Life Advice, (Metlife, Inc. 2009), available at
https://eforms.metlife.com/wcm8/cmsclient/eForms_PROD_Deployment2/15400/15268.pdf 
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Let’s say you’ve saved $200,000 in your 401k plan and you have the 
rollover payment sent directly to yourself.  That means you will get a 
check for $160,000 from that institution—not the full amount of 
$200,000.  Under the 401k rollover rules, you now have 60 days to 
deposit the full amount—$200,000—into another 401k plan, qualifying 
plan, or IRA to avoid tax penalties.  In this example you need to come 
up with the $40,000 withheld and deposit this money into your new 
retirement plan in order to match 100% of the amount withdrawn.  If 
you have considerable funds in an existing 401k plan, multiply that 
number by 20%.  This is how much money you need to supplement to 
avoid tax penalties if you take possession of the rollover money.235
Avoiding speech compelled by the underlying corporations in an 
employee’s retirement portfolio by prematurely cashing-out the plan 
subjects investors to severe financial penalties if they do not have the 
money to compensate for the loss and an alternative retirement plan lined 
up.236  If the employee intends to work for the same employer, and that 
employer only offers one retirement plan, selling the 401(k) means the 
employee will lose twenty percent of her savings.237  Investors should not 
be required to sacrifice twenty percent of their retirement account to avoid 
financing disagreeable speech.  Such penalties on speech are patently 
unfair.238
401(k) penalties on early divestment may present traditional forced 
speech issues because the tax penalties are government regulations that 
satisfy the state action necessary to invoke First Amendment protections.  
The early divestment penalties impact the First Amendment rights of the 
seventy percent of American households (eighty-two million Americans) 
owning retirement plans.239  Forcing investors to divest, or accept 
compelled political expression, affects the vast majority of American 
families because—at least in the case of 401(k)’s—it puts a twenty percent 
penalty on what invested Americans refuse to say.  After Citizens United,
striking a balance between the corporate and shareholder First Amendment 
                                                                                                                 
(discussing 401(k) plans in general). 
 235. 401k Rollover, MONEY-ZINE, http://www.money-zine.com/Financial -
Planning/Retirement/401k-Rollover/ (last visited Oct. 20, 2010) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 236. See discussion infra (illustrating an example of the penalty for investors who sell 
early). 
 237. Id. 
 238. See INV. CO. INST., supra note 230, at 94 (illustrating the reluctance of 401(k) 
participants to borrow from their plans).  
 239. Id. at 86. 
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rights may require the government to waive tax penalties for shareholders 
who choose premature divestment as a means of distancing themselves 
from disagreeable corporate speech.240
B.  Legislation Balancing Corporate Speech Rights with Shareholder 
Speech Rights 
For those instances when dissenting shareholders do not face tax 
consequences for premature divestment, this subpart argues that Congress 
should import First Amendment principles to federal election regulation to 
enhance the disclaimer and disclosure provisions already in place.  Because 
the government has an interest in protecting shareholders from corporations 
usurping the shareholders’ speech, the government may pass legislation that 
seeks to balance the First Amendment interests of corporations and 
shareholders.  This sort of balancing argument was employed by the Court 
to validate the burden of must-carry regulations on the free speech rights of 
cable television system operators and programmers in Turner Broadcasting 
System, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission.241
In Turner, cable television operators and programmers brought actions 
against the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) challenging the 
constitutionality of the FCC’s must-carry provisions,242 which required 
cable television systems to carry local broadcast stations.243  The cable 
companies argued that these regulations unconstitutionally burdened their 
First Amendment rights.244  After determining that the must-carry 
regulation was a content-neutral regulation, the Turner Court applied 
                                                                                                                 
 240. Of course, the dissenting shareholder would also have to prove that the 
disagreeable speech was not germane to the mission of the corporation, a burden that in all 
but the most egregious cases will probably prove insurmountable.  See, e.g., Keller v. State 
Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1, 2 (1990) (holding State Bar’s use of compulsory dues to finance 
political and ideological activities with which members disagreed violated their First 
Amendment right of free speech when such expenditures were "not necessarily or reasonably 
incurred for the purpose of regulating the legal profession or improving the quality of legal 
services").   
 241. See Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 185 (1997) (plurality 
opinion) (concluding that "the must-carry provisions are consistent with the First 
Amendment"). 
 242. Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992 (Cable Act), 
Pub. L. No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460. 
 243. Turner, 520 U.S. at 185–87.   
 244. Id. 
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intermediate scrutiny.245  The Court reaffirmed three important government 
interests:  "(1) preserving the benefits of free, over-the air local broadcast 
television, (2) promoting the widespread dissemination of information from 
a multiplicity of sources, and (3) promoting fair competition in the market 
for television programming."246  Assessing Congress’s determination that 
many broadcast stations would be refused carriage on cable systems absent 
the must-carry requirement, the Court found that the must-carry provision 
effectively and directly served government’s interests and did not burden 
substantially more speech than was necessary to further these substantial 
goals.247  Thus the Court upheld the regulation as a valid exercise of police 
power.248
Congress could use the Turner Court’s balancing analysis to enact 
more comprehensive legislation that regulates corporate political speech in 
the interest of protecting corporate shareholders’ First Amendment rights.  
Notably, the Turner Court categorized the must-carry regulations as 
content-neutral.249  In Citizens United, however, the Court categorized 
§ 441b’s prohibition on corporate independent expenditures as a content-
based restriction, consequently subjecting it to strict scrutiny.250   Thus, to 
satisfy strict scrutiny analysis, Congress must narrowly tailor legislation 
aimed at balancing the First Amendment rights of shareholders and 
corporations.  Furthermore, the Court must elevate the shareholder 
protection interest recognized in MCFL from a legitimate governmental 
interest to a compelling governmental interest.251
Despite MCFL’s holding that the government has a legitimate interest 
in protecting dissenting shareholders,252 the Citizens United majority 
                                                                                                                 
 245. See id. at 189 ("A content-neutral regulation will be sustained under the First 
Amendment if it advances important governmental interests unrelated to the suppression of 
free speech and does not burden substantially more speech than necessary to further those 
interests."). 
 246. Id. at 189–90. 
 247. Id. at 192–225.   
 248. Id. at 224–25.   
 249. Id. at 189–90.   
 250. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 882 (2010) ("Laws burdening such 
[political] speech are subject to strict scrutiny.").   
 251. FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life (MCFL), 479 U.S. 238, 257–60 (1986) ("The 
Government has a legitimate interest in ‘regulat[ing] the substantial aggregations of wealth 
amassed by the special advantages which go with the corporate form,’" because "[t]hose 
aggregations can distort the ‘free trade in ideas’ crucial to candidate elections, [ ] at the 
expense of members or shareholders who may disagree with the object of the 
expenditures."). 
 252. Id.
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dismissed the shareholder protection interest, relying on the notion that 
"abuses of shareholder money," such as compelled speech concerns, "can 
be corrected ‘through the procedures of corporate democracy,’ 
and . . . through Internet-based disclosures."253  While this may be true, this 
Note argues that Congress should enhance the current disclosure and 
disclaimer provisions because the established disclosure and disclaimer 
requirements and corporate democracy procedures cannot effectively 
protect dissenting shareholders from compelled speech.254
1.  Current Disclosure Requirements and Corporate Democracy 
Procedures Do Not Provide Effective Disclosure 
In addressing the benefits of disclosure for protecting shareholders, the 
Citizens United Court recommended Internet-based disclosures, noting such 
disclosures "can provide shareholders and citizens with the information 
needed to hold corporations and elected officials accountable for their 
positions and supporters."255  Disclosure is important because if 
shareholders are unaware of the political expenditures of the corporations in 
which they hold stock, they cannot be expected to independently cure the 
forced speech by voluntarily withdrawing their financial support.  Thus, at 
the very least, legislation aimed at protecting dissenting shareholders from 
forced speech must assure that shareholders are able to discover corporate 
political spending.256  As discussed in the next subpart, the current channels 
available do not sufficiently disclose corporate political spending to 
interested shareholders. 
                                                                                                                 
 253. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 978 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part) (citations omitted). 
 254. See discussion infra Parts IV–V (discussing ineffectiveness of current corporate 
democracy procedures and disclosure requirement in curing compelled speech concerns of 
dissenting shareholders). 
 255. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 916 (majority opinion). 
 256. As discussed in Part IV(A), critics of applying the forced speech doctrine to 
shareholders advocate the Wall Street rule as a sufficient cure for disagreeable corporate 
speech, but if shareholders are not made aware of the offensive spending, they cannot take 
advantage of the Wall Street rule to cure compelled expression. 
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a.  BCRA-Mandated Disclosure Requirements 
Despite the heated disagreement between the majority, concurring, and 
dissenting opinions in Citizens United, eight Justices supported upholding 
the BCRA's disclosure, disclaimer, and reporting requirements.257
Assuming corporations disclose political spending and investors know how 
to discover this information,258 some evidence supports the assertion that 
the Internet could be an effective tool for discovering corporate political 
spending.259  However, as they are implemented today, the BCRA 
disclosure provisions do not provide adequate notice to shareholders about 
corporate political expenditures. 
Citizens United upheld BCRA’s disclaimer and disclosure provisions 
as applied to ads for Hillary Movie, and for Hillary Movie, itself.260  These 
disclosure requirements are codified at 2 U.S.C. § 441d, and require that 
certain types of electioneering broadcasts disclose the name of the person or 
organization sponsoring the advertisement.261   Section 441d further 
                                                                                                                 
 257. See generally Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 931 (2010) (Stevens, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Although I concur in the Court’s decision to 
sustain BCRA’s disclosure provisions and join Part IV of its opinion, I emphatically dissent 
from its principal holding." (emphasis added)). 
 258. See infra Part IV.B.1.b and accompanying text (discussing the difficulties 
investors face in finding information on the FEC website); see also infra Part IV.B.1.c and 
accompanying text (discussing further difficulties shareholders face when they have the 
burden to discover political contributions).  These discussions show that these are two very 
big assumptions. 
 259. See INV. CO. INST., supra note 230, at 81 ("In 2008, 91 percent of U.S. households 
owning mutual funds had Internet access."); see also id. at 82 ("In 2008, 82 percent of 
shareholders with Internet access went online for financial purposes, most often to obtain 
investment information or check their bank or investment accounts . . . ."). 
 260. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 885 (majority opinion). 
 261. See 2 U.S.C. § 441d(a)(3) (2010) (outlining disclosure requirements).  
Specifically, § 441 provides: 
[W]henever any person makes a disbursement for the purpose of financing 
communications expressly advocating the election or defeat of a clearly 
identified candidate, or solicits any contributions through any broadcasting 
station, newspaper, magazine, outdoor advertising facility, mailing, or any other 
type of general public political advertising or makes a disbursement for an 
electioneering communication (as defined in § 434(f)(3) of this title), such 
communication . . . if not authorized by a candidate, an authorized political 
committee of a candidate, or its agents, shall clearly state the name and 
permanent street address, telephone number, or World Wide Web address of the 
person who paid for the communication and state that the communication is not 
authorized by any candidate or candidate’s committee. 
Id.
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requires that such communications that are "transmitted through radio or 
television . . . include, . . . in a clearly spoken manner, the following audio 
statement:  ‘_____ is responsible for the content of this advertising.’ (with 
the blank to be filled in with the name of the political committee or other 
person paying for the communication and the name of any connected 
organization of the payor)."262  Additionally, under § 201, any person who 
spends more than $10,000 on electioneering communications within a 
calendar year must file a disclosure statement with the FEC.263  That 
statement must identify the person making the expenditure, the amount of 
the expenditure, the election to which the communication was directed, and 
the names of certain contributors.264  The Citizens United Court upheld 
these disclosure provisions, concluding that the public interest "in knowing 
who is speaking about a candidate shortly before an election" justifies 
disclosure of who (or, which corporation) is spending money on 
electioneering communications.265
b.  For-Profit Corporations that Fund Nonprofit Corporations Should also 
Be Disclosed and Reported to the FEC 
An important consideration for the purposes of this Note is whether 
§ 434(f)(3) requires disclosure of corporate political expenditures that are 
not directly spent on electioneering, but rather are given to another 
business, such as a nonprofit, to support that business’s electioneering 
activities.  For example, Citizens United, a now-infamous nonprofit, 
acquires some of its funding from for-profit corporations.266  If a for-profit 
corporation that contributes to Citizens United, "Corp X," makes a 
significant financial donation to Citizens United for the purpose of 
advocating for a specific political cause, is Citizens United required to 
disclose the identity of Corp X?  Maybe.  Section 434(f)(2)(F) requires that 
the organization sponsoring the electioneering communication disclose to 
the FEC "the names and addresses of all contributors who contributed an 
aggregate amount of $1000 or more to the person making the 
                                                                                                                 
 262. 2 U.S.C. § 441d(d)(2) (2010). 
 263. 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(1) (2010). 
 264. 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(2); see Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. at 885 (explaining 
disclosure requirements). 
 265. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 915. 
 266. See id. at 887 (describing Citizens United). 
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disbursement."267  Thus, in the hypothetical, § 434 appears to require 
Citizens United to disclose to the FEC any amounts over $1,000 that Corp 
X contributed to Citizens United’s electioneering efforts.268  The FEC then 
makes that information publicly available through the FEC website.269
What is not as clear is whether § 434 requires the nonprofit to report the 
parent company associated with the for-profit expenditure.  In other words, 
if Corp X is a subsidiary of Corp XYZ, but the political expenditure 
purports to come from Corp X, which name does Citizens United report to 
the FEC?  As discussed above, from the inception of campaign finance 
reform, legislative loopholes have plagued Congress’s efforts to regulate 
corporate political spending.270  Congress should amend § 434 to require 
disclosure of the parent company for all corporations directly or indirectly 
engaged in electioneering communications.  If Congress implements this 
change, § 434 will provide one measure for an especially prudent 
shareholder to discover the political spending of a specific corporation. 
Even with the information available on the FEC website, navigating 
the website is an arduous and time-consuming process.271  At the time of 
writing, the FEC website does not provide an updated and searchable list of 
contributing corporations.272  The FEC website probably lacks this 
information because previously it was not required to list such 
information.273  Yet, at the time of writing, more than a year has passed 
since the Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United, and during that year 
a national election took place in which Americans elected representatives 
for one-third of the Senate and the entire House of Representatives.274
                                                                                                                 
 267. 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(2)(F). 
 268. See id. 
 269. See 2 U.S.C. § 434(i)(A) (noting that the FEC makes disclosure information 
available on the FEC website). 
 270. See discussion supra at Part I.B and accompanying text. 
 271. See TORRES-SPELLISCY, supra note 32, at 11 (noting difficulty of tracking 
contributions).  
 272. Disclosure Data Catalog, FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, http://www.fec.gov/ 
data/ (last visited Feb. 6, 2010) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights 
and Social Justice).  But see TORRES-SPELLISCY, supra note 32, at 11 (noting difficulty in 
navigating FEC disclosure information for PACs).  
 273. Prior to Citizens United, § 203’s ban on corporate political expenditures prevented 
corporations from engaging in the electioneering that § 434 requires political spenders 
disclose to the FEC for publication on the FEC’s website.  See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 
S. Ct. 876, 913 (2010) (overruling "BCRA § 203’s extension of § 441b’s restrictions on 
corporate independent expenditures"); 2 U.S.C. § 434(i)(A) (noting that the FEC makes 
disclosure information available on the FEC website). 
 274. Elections, UNITED STATES SENATE, http://www.senate.gov/reference/reference_ 
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News reports and voluntary disclosures by various corporations establish 
that corporations were funding electioneering communications through 
political expenditures in the 2010 elections.275  Thus, this Part provides 
recommendations for how the FEC should structure its website to provide 
the disclosure hailed by the Citizens United majority. 
Given the complexity of listing parent corporations and subsidiary 
corporations, in addition to their corresponding contributions, the only way 
to assure this information is easily accessible involves allowing users to 
search by corporation.276  The public should be able to perform a Google-
like search by corporate name that returns links to all political expenditures 
by that corporation for the past several elections.  The website should 
provide advanced search options to help the public restrict searches by 
district in which the electioneering communication aired, and even the 
candidate the electioneering communication supported or opposed. 
The current design of the website does allow users to input corporate 
names in an "Individual Search" database,277 but the results are unwieldy 
and disorganized.  The "Individual Search" results lump corporations and 
people together, such that a search for "Target" reveals the electioneering 
expenditures of businesses such as "Target Corporation, " "Target Stores, " 
and "Targeted Creative" on the same page as the electioneering 
expenditures of individuals, such as "Marci Target" and "Stephen 
                                                                                                                 
index_subjects/Elections_Campaigns_vrd.htm (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal 
of Civil Rights and Social Justice).  
 275. See, e.g., John Gibeaut, A Cautionary Tale of Corporate Political Spending 
Emerges in Minnesota, ABA J. (Oct. 22, 2010, 2:48 PM CST), http://www.aba 
journal.com/news/article/a_cautionary_tale_target_corporate_political_spending_emerges_in_
minnesota/ (discussing Target’s decision to give money to the political campaign of a 
candidate who offended many gay rights activists) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 276. See discussion infra (noting problems with website already in place).  It is 
probably not realistic to expect interested shareholders to navigate the confusion of the FEC 
website. And even if navigating the site is not unreasonable, it cannot be realistic to expect 
shareholders to search for this information if it is never revealed to them that the company 
they are interested in is making these political expenditures.  Because, while § 434 requires 
disclosure of Corp X to the FEC, § 441d does not require that Corp X be included in the 
disclaimer listing sponsoring corporations of the television or radio broadcast.  2 U.S.C. § 
441d(d)(2).  As a result, unless Corp X is directly sponsoring the political advertisement, the 
shareholder would have to check the FEC website, on her own, without really knowing what 
she is looking for.  And, of course, this again assumes that the website is reasonably 
accessible.   
 277. Transaction Query by Individual Contributor, FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION,
http://www.fec.gov/finance/disclosure/norindsea.shtml (last visited Mar. 7, 2011) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).  
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Targett."278  Certainly, a more efficient search would provide a corporate 
database that is separate from the individual database.  Additionally, the 
search results reveal that one corporate entity may be listed under several 
different names.279  For example, the website lists "Target Corporation" 
three different times with three separate area codes, though two of the zip 
codes only differ as to their last digit.280  The website also returned search 
results for two separate entries of "Target Stores," yet both entries are listed 
as being located at the same zip code.281  If some of these separate entries 
are actually referring to the same company, the website should condense the 
list such that users do not have to ponder which listing relates to which 
company. 
Another way the FEC could clarify the search results is to provide the 
New York Stock Exchange ticker symbol, and perhaps even a link to the 
parent company’s webpage.  Finally, users should be able to "follow the 
money."  For example, as discussed at the beginning of this Note, in 2010, 
Target Corporation gave "$100,000 in cash and another $50,000 in services 
to MN Forward, a committee organized by the state Chamber of 
Commerce," which MN Forward then spent "on advertising supporting 
Republican candidate Tom Emmer."282  As the website is currently 
designed, a user can search by corporation or candidate, but not both.  In 
other words, to determine whether Target gave money to Tom Emmer, a 
user would have to search under "Target," select one of the many 
hyperlinks for committees receiving Target’s political expenditures, then 
hope that the recipient committee’s page lists candidates the committee 
supported or opposed.  If Tom Emmer was not listed, the user would need 
to repeat the process for every recipient committee until she found Emmer.  
A simple Boolean search allowing users to search with connecting terms, 
such as "Target AND Emmer," to trace whether corporate expenditures 
financed specific candidates would dramatically improve the efficiency of 
the FEC website. 
                                                                                                                 
 278. See id. (search "Target") (last visited Mar. 7, 2011) (returning search results for 
"Target"). 
 279. Id.
 280. Id. 
 281. Id. 
 282. Gibeaut, supra note 275. 
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c.  Given the Breadth and Diversity of the Average American’s Portfolio, 
Putting the Burden of Discovering Political Contributions on Corporate 
Shareholders Is Unrealistic and Unfair 
Even if shareholders are able to locate relevant information about a 
corporation on the FEC website, effective disclosure assumes the 
shareholder knows that the corporation is among the hundreds of securities 
within her portfolio.  For this reason, the "transparency" relied on by the 
Citizens United majority is effectively opaque.283   Because most Americans 
invest through mutual funds and pension plans, it is exceedingly difficult 
for the general public to "monitor and to alter particular holdings."284  The 
majority’s claim that Internet-based disclosures serve the shareholder 
protection interest285 is flawed in that it presupposes shareholders know, or 
could know, in which corporations they hold stock.286
                                                                                                                 
 283. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 916 (2010) (majority opinion) (relying 
on transparency in advocating disclosure as a proper remedy for protecting shareholders 
from compelled speech).  As the majority noted: 
Shareholders can determine whether their corporation’s political speech 
advances the corporation’s interest in making profits, and citizens can see 
whether elected officials are "‘in the pocket’ of so-called moneyed interests."  
The First Amendment protects political speech; and disclosure permits citizens 
and shareholders to react to the speech of corporate entities in a proper way.  
This transparency enables the electorate to make informed decisions and give 
proper weight to different speakers and messages.  
Id. (citations omitted). 
 284. Id. at 978 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also Alicia 
Davis Evans, A Requiem for the Retail Investor?, 95 VA. L. REV. 1105, 1105 (2009) ("The 
American retail investor is dying.").  Noting the diminishing number of retail investors, 
Evans discusses investor characteristics over the past sixty years:  "In 1950, retail investors 
owned over 90% of the stock of U.S corporations.  Today, retail investors own less than 
30% and represent a very small percentage of U.S. trading volume. . . . There is no question 
that U.S. securities markets are now dominated by institutional investors."  Id.  Institutional 
investors are those corporations or other entities that invest "in securities of other 
corporations."  Id. at 441.  Investment companies are themselves entities that issue shares. 
Investors may purchase these shares and thereby obtain instant diversification, because the 
shares that an investment company issues in effect constitute investment in the portfolio 
owned by the investment company.  Id.  "A mutual fund is one type of investment company, 
but there are many others."  Id.  Approximately 90 million American investors own mutual 
funds.  See Taub, supra note 226, at 847–48 (discussing characteristics of American 
investors). 
 285. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 916 (2010) (majority opinion) 
("Shareholder objections raised through the procedures of corporate democracy . . . can be 
more effective today because modern technology makes disclosure rapid and informative."). 
 286. See id. at 978 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("If the 
corporation in question operates a PAC, an investor who sees the company’s ads may not 
know whether they are being funded through the PAC or through the general treasury.").
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Appreciating the difficulty entailed in monitoring mutual funds 
requires understanding that mutual funds are constantly buying and selling 
different companies.287  Thus, the securities comprising the fund when the 
investor first purchases her shares will not necessarily be the same 
securities she will own in six months or a year.288  Of course, an investor 
can make herself aware of the companies comprising the fund by reviewing 
a report listing the fund’s holdings,289 but discovering the companies in 
which the mutual fund invests involves costs—both in time and in 
money.290  And, as a practical matter, the average investor may not be able 
to shoulder the burden and costs associated with constantly monitoring the 
hundreds of securities in her mutual fund.291
As Justice Stevens appropriately points out, the argument that a 
shareholder need only divest herself of the offending security to be free of 
compelled expression292 only partially solves the injury to the shareholders’ 
expressive rights.293  For, as Justice Stevens’s dissent in Citizens United
observes, assuming shareholders reliably learn of the corporate spending: 
                                                                                                                 
 287. See HAMILTON & BOOTH, supra note 23, at 521 (discussing that most mutual funds 
are actively managed); see also Mutual Funds, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/Investors/ 
SmartInvesting/ChoosingInvestments/MutualFunds/ (last visited Mar. 4, 2010) (noting the 
dynamic nature of mutual funds) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil 
Rights and Social Justice).  
 288. See HAMILTON & BOOTH, supra note 23, at ("Most mutual funds are actively 
managed.  That means the fund manager shifts investments aggressively in order to 
maximize the return to investors.").  For investors who do not want the costs associated with 
the active management of most mutual funds, index funds are a viable option.  Index funds 
structure their portfolios with securities "that . . . closely mimics the mix of stocks in one or 
more broad market indexes."  Id.  Nevertheless, even index funds involve some trading.  See 
id. at 526 (noting index funds minimize trading).     
 289. See Securities Exchange (Exchange) Act of 1934, ch. 404, sec. 1, 13(f)(1), 48 Stat. 
881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.S. § 78a, § 78m(f) (2010)) (requiring institutional 
investment managers to periodically disclose acquired securities). 
 290. See discussion infra (discussing dynamic nature of mutual fund portfolios). 
 291. See id. (stating that it is difficult for investors to monitor portfolios because they 
invest through mutual funds and pension plans). 
 292. See Transcript of Re-argument at 57–59, Citizens United v FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 
(2010) (No. 08-205) (suggesting dissenting shareholders could just sell objectionable stock).  
During re-argument in Citizens United, Justice Roberts asked Sol. Gen. Elena Kagan, "can’t 
[shareholders] sell their shares or object in the corporate context" if the objecting 
shareholder does not like the corporate political spending.  Id.
 293. See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 978 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (stating that even if "shareholders learn that a corporation has been 
spending general treasury money on objectionable electioneering . . . this solution is only 
partial"). 
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The injury to the shareholders’ expressive rights has already occurred; 
they might have preferred to keep that corporation’s stock in their 
portfolio for any number of economic reasons; and they may incur a 
capital gains tax or other penalty from selling their shares, changing 
their pension plan, or the like.294
But more specifically, mutual funds are comprised of hundreds of 
securities, so even if an investor discovers a security in her fund that is 
making disagreeable political expenditures, the investor cannot sell the 
single offending security.295  Rather, if an investor is unhappy with the 
business practices of one company in the fund, she must sell the entire 
fund.296  Requiring a dissenting investor to choose between selling her 
entire mutual fund because of the disagreeable political spending of one 
security, or being compelled to speak is patently unfair.  Indeed, 
Americans’ investing practices demonstrate that investing households 
owning IRAs "tend to preserve their IRA assets as long as possible."297
Further, given the prevalence of mutual funds in American households, it is 
not surprising that "[s]tudies show that a majority of individual investors 
make no trades at all during a given year."298
Considering the significant difficulties most shareholders face in 
determining in which corporations they own stock, disclosure and 
disclaimer improvements may not directly impact most investors’ decision-
                                                                                                                 
 294. Id.
 295. See Taub, supra note 226, at 106–07 (discussing the structure and distribution of 
mutual funds).  "A mutual fund that holds corporate stocks is considered to be the 
shareholder of that corporation.  The person (or institution) who invests money in the mutual 
fund is considered to be the shareholder of the mutual fund."  Id.  Consequently, the 
decisions regarding in which corporations to invest fall to the board of directors of the fund 
("fund directors").  See INV. CO. INST., A GUIDE TO UNDERSTANDING MUTUAL FUNDS 28 
(2007), available at http://www.ici.org/pdf/bro_understanding_mfs_p.pdf (noting fund 
directs must execute business affairs of the mutual fund "in the best interests of fund 
shareholders").  Additionally, the board of directors hires an investment adviser to manage 
the fund.  Taub, supra note 226, at 107–08.  Although the advisor owes fiduciary duties to 
the fund, "[i]n reality . . . the Adviser runs the show."  Id.  Consequently, the adviser makes 
the investment decisions for the fund.  Id.  Furthermore, the business judgment rule protects 
the adviser’s decisions.  See discussion infra Part II.B.2, notes 335–37 (discussing the 
business judgment rule).  Therefore, when fund shareholders are dissatisfied with the fund’s 
investment decisions, their only real defense is to follow the Wall Street Rule and divest.  
Taub, supra note 226, at 878. 
 296. See Taub, supra note 226, at 878 (discussing the Wall Street Rule and how 
investors can sell their shares if they do not approve of management’s actions). 
 297. INV. CO. INST., supra note 230, at 99.  
 298. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 978 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part). 
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making.  Still, disclosure and disclaimer improvements may place public 
pressure on corporations to avoid political expenditures that their 
shareholders and their patrons find disagreeable.299  Even if the corporation 
does not initially cave to this public pressure,300 larger shareholders with a 
direct stake in the corporation may introduce proxy initiatives 
recommending political spending limits.301  Although the validity of such 
proxy initiatives remains unclear,302 the public and media attention drawn 
by such initiatives could place added pressure on corporations to rein-in 
their political spending.303  Finally, prudent corporations heeding the 
lessons of Target’s political activity, discussed above, may well decide the 
risk to their reputation is not worth the anticipated gain from a political 
expenditure. 
2.  Current Corporate Democracy Procedures Do Not Adequately Protect 
Dissenting Shareholders 
The Citizens United majority concluded that "[t]here is [ ] little 
evidence of abuse that cannot be corrected by shareholders ‘through the 
procedures of corporate democracy.’"304  Although the Court does not 
                                                                                                                 
 299. See, e.g., Press Release, Target Brands, Inc., Civic Activity (Aug. 5, 2010), 
available at http://pressroom.target.com/pr/news/civic-activity.aspx  (apologizing for 
Target’s political expenditure to organization supporting an anti-gay rights politician) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 300. See, e.g., Abe Sauer, The Anti-Gay Donations that Target Apologized for?  They 
Never Stopped, THE AWL, Dec. 21, 2010, available at http://www.theawl.com/2010/12/the-
anti-gay-donations-that-target-apologized-for-they-never-stopped ("According to documents 
filed with the FEC in October 2010, Target continued donating to a bevy of anti-gay 
politicians even after [CEO] Steinhafel apologized and committed to reforming the review 
process for future political donations. These donations even included some of the same anti-
gay politicians the company had already been criticized for supporting.") (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 301. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson Jr., Commentary, Corporate Political 
Speech:  Who Decides?, 125 Harv. L. Rev. 83, 87–88 (2010) (discussing proxy options). 
 302. See id. ("Whether shareholders may use the federal proxy rules to put forward 
proposals recommending changes to the amount or targets of political spending is unclear, 
but such proposals, if included in the proxy and adopted by the shareholders, would in any 
event be nonbinding."). 
 303. See Jeff Cossette, Investors Target Political Spending, INVESTOR RELATIONS 
MAG., Feb. 4, 2011, available at http://www.insideinvestorrelations.com/articles/18037/ 
investors-target-political-spending/ (noting "[m]ore than 45 companies could face proxy 
initiatives on disclosing and accounting for their political donations this year") (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).  
 304. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 911 (2010) (majority opinion) (citing First 
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elaborate on what it means by procedures of "corporate democracy," Justice 
Stevens interprets the majority to mean "the rights of shareholders to vote 
and to bring derivative suits for breach of fiduciary duty."305  Every state 
already has statutory and decisional laws that create rights for individual 
shareholders to sue corporate boards for making "wasteful expenditures."306
Alleging wasteful spending is a claim that the directors irrationally 
squandered the corporation’s assets in a way that did not advance the 
corporation’s interests.307  Yet, Professor Lawrence H. Tribe, a 
constitutionally renowned legal scholar, dismisses the checking effect of 
waste claims, arguing that: 
[S]hareholder democracy is largely illusory in a world where there are 
countless obstacles to vigilant oversight of corporate management by the 
widely dispersed "owners" of the underlying enterprise, especially when 
most of those owners have only the most attenuated link to their stock 
holdings, a link made all the more tenuous by the fact, noted in the 
Stevens dissent in Citizens United, that "[m]ost American households 
that own stock do so through intermediaries such as mutual funds and 
pension plans, . . . which makes it more difficult both to monitor and to 
alter particular holdings."308
The onerous standard for successfully pleading corporate waste 
buttresses the ineffectiveness of the largely illusory corporate democracy.309
The director’s duty to exercise informed business judgment derives 
from the duty of care.310  In Delaware, the business judgment rule presumes 
                                                                                                                 
Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 794 (1978)). 
 305. Id. at 978 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 306. See Posting of Lawrence H. Tribe & Carl Loeb, What Should Congress Do About 
Citizens United?, SCOTUSblog (Jan. 24, 2010, 10:30 PM) http://www.scotusblog.com/ 
2010/01/what-should-congress-do-about-citizens-united/ (Jan. 24, 2010) (discussing the 
current state of state laws regarding expenditures) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 307. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation, 906 A.2d 27, 73–74 (Del. Supr. 
2006) (defining a claim for corporate waste); see also Tribe supra note 306 (discussing the 
waste claim). 
 308. Tribe, supra note 306.
 309. See In re Walt Disney Co., 906 A.2d at 73–74 (discussing the standard for 
successfully pleading corporate waste).  "To recover on a claim of corporate waste, the 
plaintiffs must shoulder the burden of proving that the exchange was ‘so one sided that no 
business person of ordinary, sound judgment could conclude that the corporation has 
received adequate consideration.’  A claim of waste will arise only in the rare, 
‘unconscionable case where directors irrationally squander or give away corporate assets.’"  
Id.   
 310. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872–73 (Del. 1985) (describing the 
business judgment rule). 
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that in making business decisions, directors "were informed, acted in good 
faith and honestly believed that the decision was in the best interests of the 
corporation."311  This principle serves dual purposes:  (1) recognizing courts 
do not have the expertise, nor is it their role to second guess corporate 
decision making; and (2) guarding against concern that if directors fear 
personal liability they will be less likely to take business risks that produce 
gain.312  Given these director-friendly standards, a claim for waste, 
premised on a corporation’s political spending, is so unlikely to succeed, 
that claiming such legislation empowers shareholders boarders on 
disingenuous.313
C.  Recommendations Following Citizens United 
Some critics of the uproar over Citizens United argue that the case will 
have little effect on corporate spending because corporations will police 
themselves.314  For example, Richard Epstein, a noted legal scholar at the 
University of Chicago Law School, suggested in a recent issue of FORBES
that "‘corporate realities and market constraints’ will prevent any adverse 
outcomes if corporate general treasury funds are unleashed for political 
spending."315  But, as Brenda Wright, the director of the Democracy 
Program, notes, America’s history of campaign finance does not offer much 
support for this notion.316  For example, Wright points to the FEC’s soft-
money exemption, which allows unlimited donations to political parties by 
corporations, unions, and individuals.317  In 1984, these "soft-money 
                                                                                                                 
 311. Id. 
 312. Id. 
 313. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 978 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part) (observing that "many corporate lawyers will tell you that ‘these 
rights are so limited as to be almost nonexistent,’ given the internal authority wielded by 
boards and managers and the expansive protections afforded by the business judgment 
rule"). 
 314. See Brenda Wright, Examining High Court’s Consideration of Campaign Finance 
Regulation, AM. CONSTITUTION SOCIETY, Sept. 8, 2009, http://www.acslaw.org/node/14062 
(last visited Oct. 20, 2010) (discussing impact of Citizens United) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 315. Id.
 316. See id. (stating that American history in general provides little support for the 
notion); see also discussion infra (noting the exponential increase of parties’ election 
spending from 1984 to 2000). 
 317. See Wright, supra note 314 (discussing the impact of soft money on campaign 
finance).  
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donations accounted for only five percent ($21.6 million) of the two major 
parties’ total expenditures, but in 2000—just four presidential election 
cycles later—they accounted for forty-two percent of the parties’ spending 
($498 million)."318
These soft money funds are neither subject to BCRA’s disclosure 
requirements, nor subject to its source and amount limitations.319   Yet, as 
Justice Stevens points out in his dissent in Citizens United, corporations and 
unions will have a dramatically enhanced role in political parties and 
choosing electoral candidates because the soft money contributions that 
BCRA bars political parties from soliciting or spending will remain 
prohibited.320  "Going forward, corporations and unions will be free to 
spend as much general treasury money as they wish on ads that support or 
attack specific candidates, whereas national parties will not be able to spend 
a dime of soft money on ads of any kind."321  If history conveys anything 
about the future, corporate political expenditures will likely have a huge 
impact on the treasuries of political parties.322  As the Solicitor General’s 
supplemental brief in Citizens United explains, if during the 2007–08 
elections the Fortune 100 companies spent just one percent of their profits 
on electoral advocacy, "such spending would have more than doubled the 
federally-reported disbursements of all American political parties and PACs 
combined."323
In stark contrast with those calling Citizens United the Dred Scott
decision of the present generation,324 some commentators argue that state 
elections demonstrate that the effect of the case may not be so drastic.325
                                                                                                                 
 318. Id.
 319. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 940 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part) (describing soft money funds under 2 U.S.C. § 441i). 
 320. See id. ("Political parties are barred under BCRA from soliciting or spending ‘soft 
money,’ funds that are not subject to the statute’s disclosure requirements or its source and 
amount limitations.").
 321. Id.
 322. See Wright, supra note 314 (discussing the impact of corporate political 
expenditures). 
 323. Supplemental Brief for the Appellee at 17, Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 
(2010) (No. 08-205); see also Wright, supra note 314 (discussing the impact of corporate 
political expenditures). 
 324. See Keith Olbermann, Special Comment, Jan. 21, 2010, available at 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AMTJ--JWJqM&NR=1 (last visited Oct. 20, 2010) 
(referencing Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 HOW. 393, 407 (1857) (finding that people of 
African descent who were held as slaves are not protected by the Constitution and cannot 
become United States citizens)). 
 325. See discussion infra notes (stating that commentators look at corporate spending to 
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This argument is premised on the fact that corporate spending on state 
elections does not appear to have overwhelmed elections in the more than 
two dozen states allowing unlimited corporate spending.326  Proponents of 
this argument reason that corporations spend conservatively on elections 
because they want to avoid alienating large sectors of their customers and 
clients.327  Notably, if this reasoning truly underlies the reluctance of 
corporations to engage in political spending, effective disclosure is 
necessary for the potential market reaction to continue imposing a check on 
corporate spending.328  Likewise, because the Court’s decision to hold 
§ 441b unconstitutional only affects corporate political expenditures within 
the thirty-day period before an election, critics of the Citizens United panic 
argue the decision will not make much difference in election spending.329
This critique, however, assumes engaging in political speech is equally 
enticing, notwithstanding the proximity of the speech to the election it is 
offered to influence. 
1.  Congress Should Build on Disclosure and Disclaimer Provisions 
Article I, § 8 of the U.S. Constitution grants Congress the power to 
regulate interstate commerce.330  Pursuant to this power, some authorities 
argue Congress should craft legislation protecting people from having their 
money used by corporations for political spending.331  Federal legislation in 
this area is particularly important because after the Supreme Court’s 
                                                                                                                 
show that Citizens United has not had a drastic effect). 
 326. Tribe, supra note 306. 
 327. See id. ("[B]usiness corporations are necessarily risk-adverse and hesitate to 
alienate large sectors of their customer and client base by pouring large sums of money."); 
but see Gibeaut, supra note 275 (discussing Target’s decision to give money to the political 
campaign of a candidate who offended many gay rights activists). 
 328. See id. (noting reasoning for conservative corporate spending presumes open and 
visible spending). 
 329. See Citizens United v. FEC 130 S. Ct. 876, 929 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part) (noting that Citizens United "could have used those assets to 
televise and promote Hillary:  The Movie wherever and whenever it wanted to[;] . . . [i]t also 
could have spent unrestricted sums to broadcast Hillary at any time other than the 30 days 
before the last primary election"). 
 330. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 331. See Tribe, supra note 306 (stating Congress should use its authority under the 
Commerce Clause to protect shareholders’ investments from being deployed to candidates 
contrary to the shareholders’ beliefs and wishes). 
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holding in U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton,332 questions remain about whether 
states have the constitutional authority to regulate corporate activity in 
connection with the election of federal officials.  In Thornton, the Supreme 
Court held that "states may not interfere with the uniquely federal 
relationship between citizens and their federal representatives."333  Indeed, 
Professor Tribe argues that "Congress may legitimately act under the 
Commerce Clause to enhance the efficacy of each shareholder’s ability to 
ensure that his or her investment is not deployed to advance or obstruct the 
election of particular candidates to federal (or, indeed, state) office contrary 
both to that shareholder’s own wishes and, more importantly in this context, 
to the corporation’s business interests."334
Tribe argues this federal legislation should build on the disclosure and 
disclaimer requirements upheld in Citizens United.  Moreover, this federal 
legislation could serve as a model for states to follow.335  Tribe suggests 
bolstering these disclosure and disclaimer requirements by enlarging the 
sponsoring corporation’s identifying statement, and including certification 
from the corporate sponsor’s CEO about how much the corporation spent 
on the electioneering.336   Finally, Tribe’s proposal requires the CEO to 
certify during the disclaimer that the general treasury expenditure 
"significantly advances the corporation’s business interests."337  Beefing up 
these requirements, Tribe argues, would undercut the influence of the 
corporate funded electioneering by lifting the "veil of public-
spiritedness."338  As this Note has argued, bolstering disclosure and 
disclaimer requirements is certainly an important step in limiting the forced 
speech concerns following Citizens United, but Professor Tribe’s solution 
fails to account for electioneering communications indirectly funded by 
corporations.  Corporations making expenditures to political committees 
would not be ousted by this recommendation, and consequently more 
                                                                                                                 
 332. See U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 783 (1995) (finding that 
individual states cannot adopt their own qualifications for congressional service).  
 333. Id.
 334. Tribe, supra note 306.
 335. See id. ("Whatever individual states might do to beef up their shareholder 
protections with respect to corporate spending in state or federal candidate elections, federal 
legislation could usefully set both a nationwide floor of protection and a model for states to 
follow and build upon."). 
 336. Id. 
 337. Id. 
 338. Id. 
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corporations may elect to shield their expenditures in this way to avoid the 
disclosure statement. 
Professor Tribe also proposes buttressing the congressional disclosure 
requirements by creating a federal cause of action for corporate waste.339
This federal legislation would serve to deter improper political expenditures 
by imposing individual liability on the corporate officers making the 
spending decisions for the general treasury.340  In conjunction with this new 
cause of action, Tribe advocates replacing the business judgment rule, 
which, as discussed above, makes waste cases notoriously difficult to 
win.341  He advocates replacing this principle with "a rule less deferential to 
management and more focused on the existence of a convincing 
justification for using general treasury funds."342  Although these are 
interesting suggestions, the concerns underlying the business judgment rule, 
discussed above, counsel against adopting Professor Tribe’s proposal.  
Legislatures would probably be unwilling to return to the panic that ensued 
following the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in Smith v. Van 
Gorkom.343 Van Gorkom held directors of a publicly held corporation 
personally liable for breach of their fiduciary duty to stockholders.344  The 
decision unleashed a panic in the business world prompting states to adopt 
                                                                                                                 
 339. See id. (stating congressional disclosure requirements would fall within the 
commerce power of Congress). 
 340. See id. (stating legislation could provide a greater incentive for suit, as well as 
provide better deterrence).  
 341. See id. (stating business judgment rule makes cases difficult to bring under state 
law and should be replaced). 
 342. Id.; see also Bradley A. Smith, Citizens United, Shareholder Rights, and Free 
Speech:  Restoring the Primacy of Politics to the First Amendment, Part II, SCOTUSBLOG 
(Feb. 2, 2010, 2:01 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2010/02/citizens-united-shareholder-
rights-and-free-speech-restoring-the-primacy-of-politics-to-the-first-amendment-2/ 
(suggesting critics of Citizens United should be attacking the business judgment rule instead 
of campaign finance law) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and 
Social Justice). 
 343. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 893 (Del. 1985) (holding directors 
personally liable for breach of fiduciary duty owed to shareholders and finding reversible 
error in the Trial Court’s application of the business judgment rule in favor of the directors); 
see also WILLIAM A. KLEIN ET AL., BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS ON 
AGENCY, PARTNERSHIPS, AND CORPORATIONS 328 (Foundation Press, 7th ed. 2009) 
(discussing the legislature’s reaction to Van Gorkom Court’s decision imposing personal 
liability on corporate directors notwithstanding business judgment presumption). 
 344. See Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 893 (holding directors personally liable for breach 
of fiduciary duty owed to shareholders and finding reversible error in trial court’s 
application of business judgment rule favoring directors).  
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legislation shielding managers from personal liability.345  The same 
apprehension that personal liability might inhibit a corporation’s ability to 
retain the best directors would probably overwhelm any attempt to amend 
the business judgment rule.346
2.  Proposal to Amend the U.S. Constitution 
More drastic proposals for curing shareholders’ forced speech 
concerns involve amending the U.S. Constitution.  Indeed, members of 
Congress have proposed just that.347  Maryland state senator Jamie Raskin 
argues amending the Constitution is the only way to contain the damage 
done by Citizens United.348  Specifically, Congresswoman Donna Edwards 
(D-MD) said she plans to introduce a constitutional amendment "so that we, 
the people, can take back our elections and our democracy."349  In addition 
to the congressional response, a grassroots movement is underway to 
change the U.S. Constitution.350  Less than two weeks after the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Citizens United, a petition to amend the U.S. 
Constitution had garnered more than 58,000 signatories.351  This petition is 
just one of the many reform efforts gaining momentum after Citizens 
United.352  Of course, amending the Constitution is a difficult process, and 
in this heavily partisan political climate, relying on a method that requires 
the approval of two-thirds of Congress and three-quarters of all the states is 
                                                                                                                 
 345. See KLEIN, supra note 343 ("The decision in Smith v. Van Gorkom caused 
considerable consternation and anxiety among corporate directors.  To relieve the anxiety, 
many states adopted provisions designed to afford directors protection from liability.").  
 346. See discussion supra Part IV.C and accompanying text (discussing business 
judgment rule). 
 347. See H.R.J. Res. 74, 111th Cong. (2010) (proposing to amend U.S. Constitution to 
permit "Congress and the States to regulate the expenditure of funds by corporations 
engaging in political speech"). 
 348. Bill Moyers Journal:  We the People, Inc. (PBS television broadcast Feb. 5, 2010), 
available at http://www.pbs.org/moyers/journal/02052010/transcript1.html (transcript on file 
with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 349. Id.
 350. See MOVE TO AMEND, http://movetoamend.org/ (last visited Feb. 7, 2010) 
(establishing a petition for constitutional amendment) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 351. Id.; see also Bill Moyers Journal, supra note 348 ("More than 55 thousand people 
have signed [MovetoAmend.org’s] petition calling for a constitutional amendment."). 
 352. Bill Moyers Journal, supra note 348 ("Another reform effort at 
FreeSpeechforPeople.org has more than 35 thousand signatures."). 
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not the most realistic method of addressing concerns following Citizens 
United.353
3.  Proposal to Amend Corporate Charters 
At the founding of this country, corporations were much less prevalent 
than they are today.354  Although Justice Scalia and Justice Stevens disagree 
about just how prevalent they were, a fair reading of their opinions 
concludes that only a couple hundred corporations existed in the early years 
of the nation.355  The elaborate process required to charter corporations was 
partly responsible for their historic scarcity.356  Unlike corporate charters 
today, these early charters "specified the corporation’s powers and purposes 
and ‘authoritatively fixed the scope and content of corporate organization,’ 
including ‘the internal structure of the corporation.’"357  States granted 
charters to corporations of this time for the express purpose of serving the 
"social function of the state."358  Consequently, the legislature closely 
scrutinized corporations to ensure they acted consistent with the public 
welfare.359  Furthermore, historically corporations had very limited rights 
because they were considered "mere creature[s] of law, [ ] possess[ing] only 
those properties which the charter of [their] creation confer[ed] upon 
[them]."360
                                                                                                                 
 353. See U.S. CONST. art. V (requiring approval of two thirds of both Houses and three-
fourths of the states to amend U.S. Constitution). 
 354. See discussion infra (discussing the history of corporations). 
 355. Compare Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 925 (2010) (Scalia, J., 
concurring) (noting that during the 18th century "[t]here were approximately 335 charters 
issued to business corporations in the United States"), with id. at 949 n.53 (Stevens, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Scholars have found that only a handful of 
business corporations were issued charters during the colonial period, and only a few 
hundred during all of the 18th century."). 
 356. See discussion infra (discussing historic corporation formation). Originally, 
creating corporations required petitioning the legislature for a special legislative charter. See 
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 949 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
("Those few corporations that existed at the founding were authorized by grant of a special 
legislative charter.").
 357. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 949 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
 358. See id. (stating that corporations were legally privileged and therefore closely 
scrutinized).  
 359. Id.
 360. Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518, 636 (1819) (Marshall, 
C.J.). 
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Not until the 1800s did general incorporation statutes emerge, which 
resembled modern corporate creation.361  Because corporations are 
creatures of state law, conceivably the states can return their charters to a 
status resembling those utilized during the founding of the nation.362  In so 
doing, states could effectively limit the rights of corporations to only those 
enumerated in their charters.363  Thus, if the amended charter did not 
provide for political spending rights, corporations could not avail 
themselves of the protections of the First Amendment.364  It stretches the 
imagination, however, to seriously entertain the idea that a business-
friendly state such as Delaware would be willing to make such a drastic 
change.365  Moreover, if even one state refused to follow suit, the 
rechartering would fail to achieve its purpose because most corporations 
would simply move to the state with the least restrictions.366  For these 
reasons, redefining corporate charters is an unrealistic option for protecting 
shareholders' speech rights. 
V.  Conclusion 
Chief Justice Roberts’s conclusory assertion that dissenting 
shareholders can avoid compelled speech by following the Wall Street rule 
is no answer.367  The financial penalties resulting from the sale of certain 
investments impose serious limitations on the prudent investor’s ability to 
divest.368  Further, the Wall Street rule relies on the false premise that 
shareholders could or would discover the offending corporate political 
                                                                                                                 
 361. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 949 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part) (discussing history of general incorporation statutes). 
 362. See id. at 925 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("[I]n 1791 (as now) corporations could 
pursue only the objectives set forth in their charters."). 
 363. See id. at 949 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating that 
corporations were granted charters from the legislature, which outlined the corporation’s 
powers and purpose). 
 364. See id. at 925–26 (Scalia, J., concurring) (stating that there is no exclusion for 
corporations under the First Amendment and that corporations could historically pursue only 
those goals set out in their charters).  
 365. See ROBERT A. RAGAZZO & DOUGLAS K. MOLL, CLOSELY HELD BUSINESS 
ORGANIZATIONS 277–78 (2006) (noting Delaware’s "liberal corporate statute" attracts 
corporate managers). 
 366. See id. (discussing the selection process of a state of incorporation).
 367. See discussion supra Part IV (discussing why the Wall Street Rule is not a cure for 
compelled free speech).   
 368. See discussion supra Parts IV.A, IV.B.1.c (discussing specific penalties for certain 
divestments).
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expenditures.369  As this Note has discussed, the structure of shareholders’ 
portfolios creates an insurmountable hurdle to discovering corporate 
political spending.370  Moreover, to the extent that shareholders are able to 
discover corporate political expenditures, the business judgment rule 
impedes the ability of the dissenting shareholder to cure the forced speech 
through corporate democracy.371  Consequently, effective protection for 
shareholders’ First Amendment rights requires building on the disclosure 
and disclaimer provisions already in place. 
Effective legislation should mandate robust disclosure requirements 
for corporations that directly and indirectly make political expenditures for 
electioneering communications.  These disclosure requirements should 
extend beyond the thirty and sixty days required by § 434.372  Corporate 
political spending is no less damaging to investing shareholders’ First 
Amendment rights at sixty-one days than at twenty-nine days prior to an 
election.  If a corporation makes a political expenditure a year before the 
expenditure is used to fund an electioneering communication, the amended 
disclosure requirements should clarify that the corporation must disclose 
this expenditure.  These expanded disclosure requirements should apply to 
both for-profit and nonprofit corporations.  Applying disclosure 
requirements to nonprofit corporations assures for-profit corporations do 
not shield their political spending by funneling it through nonprofits.  
Furthermore, distinguishing between for-profit and nonprofit corporations 
presents practical difficulties because for-profit corporations could 
effectively bypass disclosure requirements by disguising electioneering 
spending as charitable giving.  If for-profit corporations give money to 
nonprofit corporations for use in electioneering, the disclosure legislation 
should require the nonprofit to disclose its contributors, including the parent 
corporations of the contributing corporations.  Putting the burden on 
nonprofit corporations to disclose parent corporations will encourage 
nonprofit corporations to demand upfront that contributing for-profit 
corporations provide them with this information. 
Above all, effective disclosure demands ease of access.  Achieving 
accessibility centers largely on improving the FEC website.373  First, 
                                                                                                                 
 369. See discussion supra Part IV.B.1.c (discussing the difficulty in monitoring and 
altering holdings). 
 370. See id. (outlining the difficulties of shareholder’s portfolios).  
 371. See discussion supra Parts IV–V (discussing the obstacles present in disclosure 
and corporate democracy). 
 372. 2 U.S.C. § 434 (2007). 
 373. See discussion supra Part IV.B (discussing navigability problems with FEC 
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disclosure should be instantaneous.  After each political expenditure, 
corporations should be able to electronically submit a political spending 
report to the FEC.  The FEC, in turn, should make these reports available 
on its website within 48 hours of receipt.  Rapid reporting and availability 
assures shareholders may timely react to disagreeable spending.  At writing, 
the FEC website does contain a realtime-updated list of independent 
disclosures professing to update within twenty-four hours of filing, but that 
list is not easily searchable and lacks the user-friendly capabilities 
necessary to qualify as an effective research tool.374  In addition to 
minimizing the time lapse between spending and reporting, the FEC should 
significantly improve website navigability.  Curious investors should be 
able to search by inputting a corporation’s name.  If the corporation queried 
has made direct political expenditures, the search should return hotlinks to 
details about that political spending and perhaps even reproductions of the 
electioneering communication.  If the corporation donated money to a 
nonprofit that participates in electioneering, that information should be 
similarly available by hotlinks.  To further improve navigability, clear 
labeling should buttress the proposed hotlinks.  The FEC website should be 
intuitive, but to aid inexperienced researchers, the FEC should produce and 
distribute a "how to," YouTube-style video. 
Admittedly, because most shareholders are rationally apathetic, they 
are less likely to take advantage of this service.  Furthermore, mutual fund 
investors who do not know in which securities their fund invests will still 
face informational hurdles not cured by these disclosure and disclaimer 
proposals.  To address some of these concerns, improvements should also 
be made to the disclaimer process. 
Section 434 limits the disclaimer requirement to a thirty- to sixty-day 
timeframe.  Congress should consider expanding this timeframe to account 
for the early start of many campaigns.375  Likewise, in addition to the 
disclaimer provisions of § 434, electioneering financed by corporations 
should include a disclaimer that other corporations may have contributed to 
                                                                                                                 
website). 
 374. See Independent Expenditures, FED. ELECTION COMM’N, http://www.fec.gov/data/ 
IndependentExpenditure.do?format=html (last visited Mar. 9, 2011) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 375. See, e.g., Michelle Austein, U.S. Presidential Election Campaigns off to an Early 
Start, AM., Jan. 19, 2007, available at http://www.america.gov/st/washfile-
english/2007/January/20070119115804hMnietsuA0.5833704.html ("The 2008 U.S. 
presidential election campaign season is off to an extraordinarily early start, according to the 
head of a leading public opinion polling organization.") (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
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funding the advertisement.  This disclaimer could read along the lines of:  
"In addition to [name of corporation directly funding the electioneering], 
other corporations may have contributed directly or indirectly to this 
political message.  For more information about which corporations financed 
this message, please visit [FEC Website] and search ‘[name of corporation 
directly funding the advertisement].’"  This type of message strikes a 
balance between informing the public of corporate sponsorship and 
protecting corporations from the burden of specifically naming all 
contributing corporations.  Additionally, Congress should expand § 434’s 
disclosure and disclaimer provisions to cover Internet electioneering.  As 
more and more Americans shift their television-watching to the Internet,376
disclosure and disclaimer provisions that do not include regulating Internet 
electioneering communications are probably too narrow to achieve 
Congress’s mission of "provid[ing] shareholders and citizens with the 
information needed to hold corporations and elected officials accountable 
for their positions and supporters."377
Lastly, as discussed above, existing corporate democracy procedures 
do not provide dissenting shareholders with an effective procedure to 
encourage corporations to make agreeable decisions regarding 
electioneering expenditures.  Moreover, a shareholder cannot directly bring 
a forced speech claim against a corporation because the corporation is not a 
government actor.  Consequently, dissenting shareholders who are not in a 
position to sell their stock, or who do not know they own stock in the 
particular corporation, will probably have to rely on public outcry to 
influence corporate electioneering expenditures.  The lesson of Target,378
discussed at the beginning of this Note, is that effective disclosure and 
disclaimer legislation aids the public in discovering, through media 
exposure, corporate political expenditures.  In this way, the First 
Amendment guarantee of a free press, aided by the disclosure and 
disclaimer improvements suggested in this Note, protects the First 
Amendment rights of corporations and shareholders alike. 
                                                                                                                 
 376. See AARON SMITH, PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT, THE INTERNET’S ROLE IN 
CAMPAIGN 2008, 46–47 (2009) (noting that "the online political news consumer audience has 
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 377. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 916 (2010) (5-4 decision). 
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